Coordinating Mental Imagery
Mental imagery appears to be an essentially private phenomenon, and, for that reason, ill-suited to play a genuinely interpersonal role. This paper argues that intersubjective coordination of mental imagery is possible without sharing token imagistic representations. I distinguish two senses in which mental imagery might be shared and argue that neither is required for imagistic coordination. Imagistic cognition can be coordinated across agents without requiring shared mental images or fully identical contents, provided that their imagistic activities are governed by shared constraints and guided by common commitments. Drawing on work on shared perception and joint action, I contend that privacy at the level of mental tokens and phenomenal character does not preclude the interpersonal coordination of mental imagery in a functionally relevant sense.
Authors
- Silvana Pani (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6923-0934)
Institutions
- University of Bergamo (IT)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Analysis
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anag092
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00