Arcaunt-CR: Silent Revocation for Coercion-Resistant Remote E-Voting with Anonymous Credential Recovery

Remote voting is open to coercion and vote buying whenever someone other than the voter can check how, or whether, a credential was used. Fake-credential protocols in the line of Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson (JCJ) remove that check, but they assume a registration the coercer cannot observe and offer no remedy once the genuine credential is captured. Arcaunt-CR is a remote voting architecture built on the opposite premise: a coercer may obtain the genuine credential, and the system is designed so that doing so gives neither lasting control over the vote nor evidence of which ballot will count. Voters prove eligibility in person and draw a sealed bearer credential at random, unlinked to their identity; they may take one indistinguishable spare and may bind the credential to a mailbox for anonymous recovery. Revocation is silent: every credential the system has issued, whether genuine, spare, revoked or replaced, is accepted, acknowledged and verifiable for inclusion in the same way, and recovery requests receive the same answers whether a binding is real or a decoy. Validity is decided only by the tally, on ciphertexts, which reveals the totals and the number of valid credentials and nothing else. We specify the requirements, the threat model and the protocol, show that every interface treats issued credentials alike, and bound the advantage of a coercer who may see and hold credentials, bind its own addresses and attend the count by what the published records, their timing and the totals reveal, in a model where the tally is an ideal functionality. We realise that functionality by letting the hardware security module, which already knows which ledger records share a credential, group them and publish the grouping only in encrypted form with public proofs, while validity and choices stay encrypted and the tally trustees only weight the ballots and decrypt the sums.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24422521
Primary Topic
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Type
preprint
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preprint

Arcaunt-CR: Silent Revocation for Coercion-Resistant Remote E-Voting with Anonymous Credential Recovery

Emilia Golemanova, Tzanko Golemanov
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
preprint

Arcaunt-CR: Silent Revocation for Coercion-Resistant Remote E-Voting with Anonymous Credential Recovery

Emilia Golemanova, Tzanko Golemanov
preprint en

Abstract

Remote voting is open to coercion and vote buying whenever someone other than the voter can check how, or whether, a credential was used. Fake-credential protocols in the line of Juels, Catalano and Jakobsson (JCJ) remove that check, but they assume a registration the coercer cannot observe and offer no remedy once the genuine credential is captured. Arcaunt-CR is a remote voting architecture built on the opposite premise: a coercer may obtain the genuine credential, and the system is designed so that doing so gives neither lasting control over the vote nor evidence of which ballot will count. Voters prove eligibility in person and draw a sealed bearer credential at random, unlinked to their identity; they may take one indistinguishable spare and may bind the credential to a mailbox for anonymous recovery. Revocation is silent: every credential the system has issued, whether genuine, spare, revoked or replaced, is accepted, acknowledged and verifiable for inclusion in the same way, and recovery requests receive the same answers whether a binding is real or a decoy. Validity is decided only by the tally, on ciphertexts, which reveals the totals and the number of valid credentials and nothing else. We specify the requirements, the threat model and the protocol, show that every interface treats issued credentials alike, and bound the advantage of a coercer who may see and hold credentials, bind its own addresses and attend the count by what the published records, their timing and the totals reveal, in a model where the tally is an ideal functionality. We realise that functionality by letting the hardware security module, which already knows which ledger records share a credential, group them and publish the grouping only in encrypted form with public proofs, while validity and choices stay encrypted and the tally trustees only weight the ballots and decrypt the sums.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Angel Kanchev University of Ruse (BG)
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
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Arcaunt-CR: Silent Revocation for Coercion-Resistant Remote E-Voting with Anonymous Credential Recovery — Emilia Golemanova, Tzanko Golemanov · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS