Are There Ontological Commitments in Tarski's Undefinability Argument?
Famous diagonal results are strictly syntactic or formal, yet philosophers draw ontological conclusions from them. This talk examines the ontological commitments of Tarski’s undefinability argument by applying a broader research project on the limits and ontology of calculation. Under an extended definition uniting logical calculi, Turing computability, arithmetic, and ZFC within a "Box of Calculation", I assume a minimal non-formalism and distinguish three interacting levels of ontological relevance: (1) Quinean meta-theoretic commitments, (2) explanatory labeled distinctions, then illuminated via structures and quantified over in supplementary constructions, and (3) global ontologies of mathematics in reflective equilibrium. I argue that Syntactic Tarski carries only minimal combinatorial commitments, whereas Semantic Tarski requires completed structures and external truth-sets. Even the syntactic version is ontologically fertile, carving a fissure between formal expressibility and truth which motivates metalanguage hierarchies and axiomatic truth theories. Ultimately, whether Tarskian undefinability points toward eternal truth next to Cantor’s paradise, to bounded finitude, or other realms depends on one’s ontology of mathematics.
Authors
- MARIAN CĂLBOREAN (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0000-2900-6033)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Figshare
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.35082871
- Primary Topic
- History and Theory of Mathematics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00