The informational effects of institutional crowding: Evidence from zombie election monitors

How do governments manage the political costs of scrutiny from international organizations? We introduce the concept of institutional crowding , whereby governments simultaneously affiliate with multiple international bodies sharing the same ostensible mandate but varying in capacity and value commitments. We develop this argument in the context of international election observation, where governments facing higher domestic electoral risk benefit from inviting not only credible election observation missions (EOMs) but also ‘zombie’ groups whose assessments are anticipated to be more lenient. The primary effects of this strategy are informational: When multiple EOMs are present, the resulting range of evaluations gives media greater latitude to present international assessments favorably, or to obscure negative findings behind conflicting signals. Using original media-based data on the presence and assessments of EOMs across 621 executive elections in 114 countries from 1998 to 2018, we show that governments facing greater domestic electoral risk — particularly where opposition strength is growing and previous elections sparked protests — are more likely to host multiple EOMs of varying quality. Notably, this pattern is not driven by autocracies alone, reflecting a broader political survival logic that cuts across regime types. Consistent with our theoretical mechanism, we show that elections hosting multiple EOMs are associated with more positive depictions of election observer assessments in the media, even as divergence among different missions increases. Beyond election observation, the logic of institutional crowding travels to any domain where institutional proliferation creates opportunities for information management.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Review of International Organizations
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-026-09653-3
Primary Topic
Political Conflict and Governance
Type
article
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article

The informational effects of institutional crowding: Evidence from zombie election monitors

Daniela Donno, Julia Gray
The Review of International Organizations
Political Conflict and Governance
article

The informational effects of institutional crowding: Evidence from zombie election monitors

Daniela Donno, Julia Gray
article en

Abstract

How do governments manage the political costs of scrutiny from international organizations? We introduce the concept of institutional crowding , whereby governments simultaneously affiliate with multiple international bodies sharing the same ostensible mandate but varying in capacity and value commitments. We develop this argument in the context of international election observation, where governments facing higher domestic electoral risk benefit from inviting not only credible election observation missions (EOMs) but also ‘zombie’ groups whose assessments are anticipated to be more lenient. The primary effects of this strategy are informational: When multiple EOMs are present, the resulting range of evaluations gives media greater latitude to present international assessments favorably, or to obscure negative findings behind conflicting signals. Using original media-based data on the presence and assessments of EOMs across 621 executive elections in 114 countries from 1998 to 2018, we show that governments facing greater domestic electoral risk — particularly where opposition strength is growing and previous elections sparked protests — are more likely to host multiple EOMs of varying quality. Notably, this pattern is not driven by autocracies alone, reflecting a broader political survival logic that cuts across regime types. Consistent with our theoretical mechanism, we show that elections hosting multiple EOMs are associated with more positive depictions of election observer assessments in the media, even as divergence among different missions increases. Beyond election observation, the logic of institutional crowding travels to any domain where institutional proliferation creates opportunities for information management.

The Review of International Organizations
University of Toronto (CA), University of Pennsylvania (US), University of Oklahoma (US)
Political Conflict and Governance
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The informational effects of institutional crowding: Evidence from zombie election monitors — Daniela Donno, Julia Gray · The Review of International Organizations (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS