Failure-Separated Unique-Consumption Verification
An auxiliary consumption identifier τ for a shielded note has a security role in one interval only: the fault breaks a component of the canonical nullifier path and leaves the circuit’s same-note wiring intact. We define fault families over the implementation artifact in which a fault lives, and compare the dependency graphs of the canonical and auxiliary paths against pinned halo2_gadgets and orchard sources. Three of the five boundary results follow. Once the primary circuit can sever its own wiring, an identifier bound through that circuit certifies the wrong note. Under such faults the consumed note is no longer well-defined, and the property left to verify is balance integrity; on an isolated orchard 0.14.0 fork, omitting any one of four located copy or equality constraints lets a real proof verify with the predicted property broken. An identifier may omit the variable-base multiplication only because it is non-canonical, and the same fact obliges it to carry a hidden bridge. For the 2026 defect, a PRF identifier bound as a full point inside the note commitment blocks both reproduced double-spend routes, at two distinct layers and about 9.5% more rows; an x-coordinate binding does not. The baseline preserves address and note formats. Its independently authored recheck of the same multiplication shares the fault. With the base anchor omitted from both implementations, a same-family pair accepts a second spend of one note under a substituted nullifier key. The τ of that spend equals the τ of the honest spend, and a set already holding the honest τ refuses it. A second correlated mutation stays at the equality layer. The correlated-failure results come from mutations injected into both implementations; all measurements are on one corpus and one fork. None estimates how often independent authors make the same mistake.
Authors
- VENALUCENS
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24420787
- Primary Topic
- Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Type
- preprint