Diplomatic recognition as bargaining leverage: estimating the foreign policy payoff of Taiwan recognition reversals among Sahel states using computed control methods
Between 2018 and 2024, several Sahel and West African states switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, and Burkina Faso's 2024 reorientation followed a broader post-coup realignment in the region. the present analysis asks whether such recognition reversals generate identifiable foreign policy payoffs for the switching state, and whether computed control methods can recover them from observational data. Because no completed dataset or computed estimates are available, the article develops the theoretical claim and the estimation design as a proposal: it models recognition as a bargaining asset whose value depends on the credibility of reversal threats, specifies a computed control estimator that treats each switcher as the treated unit and a donor pool of non-switching African states as the counterfactual, and derives the conditions under which the estimated gap in aid, trade and security cooperation can be attributed to recognition rather than to concurrent regime change. The central proposition is that recognition reversals are best understood as leverage in a repeated bargaining game with two suitors, not as one-sided bandwagoning, and that the computed control design can bound—but not fully identify—the payoff when coups and recognition decisions coincide. The article specifies scope conditions under which the design stops holding and compares credible competing explanations, including security realignment and fiscal desperation.
Authors
- Adaeze Okoro
- Daniel Mensah
Institutions
- University of Lagos (NG)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24413240
- Primary Topic
- International Relations and Foreign Policy
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00