The Accounting Discretion Dilemma: A Conceptual Review of Efficient and Opportunistic Earnings Management for Audit Practitioners
Accounting discretion allows management to exercise professional judgment in preparing financial statements. The same flexibility may be used opportunistically through earnings management, and both uses operate within accounting standards, which makes them difficult for auditors to distinguish. This article examines the conceptual distinction between efficient and opportunistic earnings management, maps the factors that shape the nature of accounting discretion, and discusses the challenges auditors face in evaluating it. A structured conceptual literature review with thematic synthesis of reputable journal publications is used. The review indicates that discretion is shaped by corporate governance, ownership structure, compensation incentives, market pressure, the regulatory environment, and business complexity, while auditors face four obstacles: limited observability of motives, the absence of a universal benchmark, independence pressure, and the complexity of principle-based standards. The article proposes the Accounting Discretion Evaluation Matrix (MEDA), a two-dimensional framework (Informational Content and Agency Incentive Intensity) supplemented with indicators, a preliminary scoring rule, audit responses for each quadrant, and propositions for empirical testing. MEDA is conceptual and has not yet been tested empirically.
Authors
- Angela Rosafine Indrayu Irenevianca
- Muh. Syah Arief Atmaja Wijaya
Institutions
- University of Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jawa Timur (ID)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Escalate Economics and Business Journal
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.61536/escalate.v4i4.918
- Primary Topic
- Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00