Discoverability Policy Design for Platform: Consider Customer Rating and Seller Competition

Platforms commonly employ consumer rating systems to mitigate information asymmetry between sellers and consumers. Another tool that platforms often employ is paid discoverability services, which allow sellers to increase product visibility and attract more customers (e.g. front-page recommendations). While empirical studies have documented correlations between consumer ratings and platform discoverability outcomes, the underlying strategic interactions among platforms, sellers, and consumers remain underexplored. Using a three-party game theoretic model, we examine the strategic trade-offs inherent in the design of discoverability policies. First, we characterize the platform’s optimal discoverability policy when both consumer ratings and seller competition are taken into account. Second, our model sheds light on two puzzling phenomena: (1) Platform discoverability services may trigger adverse selection, thereby leading to market inefficiencies; (2) Some sellers may use ultra-low pricing to overcome consumers’ quality concerns, making price the determining factor for consumers to buy products while maintaining high consumer ratings. Our findings offer a nuanced theoretical lens through which platform operators and researchers can re-evaluate the interplay between consumer ratings and discoverability policies.

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Publication Details

Journal
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-026-09645-z
Primary Topic
Digital Platforms and Economics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Discoverability Policy Design for Platform: Consider Customer Rating and Seller Competition

Qiyu Ren, Xiao Yang
Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Digital Platforms and Economics
article

Discoverability Policy Design for Platform: Consider Customer Rating and Seller Competition

Qiyu Ren, Xiao Yang
article en

Abstract

Platforms commonly employ consumer rating systems to mitigate information asymmetry between sellers and consumers. Another tool that platforms often employ is paid discoverability services, which allow sellers to increase product visibility and attract more customers (e.g. front-page recommendations). While empirical studies have documented correlations between consumer ratings and platform discoverability outcomes, the underlying strategic interactions among platforms, sellers, and consumers remain underexplored. Using a three-party game theoretic model, we examine the strategic trade-offs inherent in the design of discoverability policies. First, we characterize the platform’s optimal discoverability policy when both consumer ratings and seller competition are taken into account. Second, our model sheds light on two puzzling phenomena: (1) Platform discoverability services may trigger adverse selection, thereby leading to market inefficiencies; (2) Some sellers may use ultra-low pricing to overcome consumers’ quality concerns, making price the determining factor for consumers to buy products while maintaining high consumer ratings. Our findings offer a nuanced theoretical lens through which platform operators and researchers can re-evaluate the interplay between consumer ratings and discoverability policies.

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
Shanghai Customs College (CN)
Digital Platforms and Economics
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