The Co-Development of Artificial Cognitive Capabilities: An Integrative Theoretical Framework of Interdependent Reconfiguration, Epistemic Warrant, and Future Reachability
The development of artificial intelligence is commonly characterized in terms of computational efficiency, model scaling, learning performance, generalization, and the successful execution of increasingly complex tasks. However, the emergence of autonomous agents, self-revising scientific systems, and open-ended learning architectures raises a more fundamental question: under what conditions does an intelligent system acquire genuinely new cognitive capabilities, rather than merely improve the efficiency of capabilities it already possesses?This article develops an integrative theoretical framework for understanding the co-development of artificial cognitive capabilities through functionally interdependent transformations. Its central proposition is that cognitive development depends not only on the performance of individual mechanisms of representation, action, observation, validation, and metacognitive regulation, but also on the organization of dependencies among these mechanisms.Drawing upon information theory, statistical comparison of experiments, active perception, causal representation learning, epistemic iteration, metareasoning, and open-ended learning, the framework distinguishes informational accessibility, operational capability, epistemically warranted capability, and the future reachability of cognitive capabilities.Several conditional results are developed through explicit formal constructions. First, complementary improvements may jointly enable a cognitive capability that remains inaccessible under either improvement separately. Second, locally advantageous decision rules may fail to discover productive developmental trajectories when benefits depend on coordinated transformations. Third, the order of cognitive transformations may affect developmental outcomes when operations involve prerequisites, noncommutativity, irreversible costs, or resource limitations. Fourth, agents possessing equivalent current capabilities may nevertheless differ in the range of capabilities reachable through subsequent development.The article further distinguishes functional improvement, epistemic progress, and developmental progress, demonstrating why improvements in internal evaluation scores cannot automatically be interpreted as genuine advances in cognitive capability.The proposed framework does not claim the discovery of a new law of information theory or a universal mechanism governing all forms of intelligence. Its contribution is integrative and explanatory: it provides a unified conceptual and formal structure for investigating how interdependent cognitive processes can jointly alter the accessibility, justification, and future development of artificial cognitive capabilities.
Authors
- Roman Shaban (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-5259-6102)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-22
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24430717
- Primary Topic
- Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
- Type
- preprint