MEASURING THE VISIBILITY OF NATIVE-TOOL DISCOVERY ON WINDOWS: EVIDENCE COVERAGE, COMMAND-LINE FIDELITY AND LOG RETENTION UNDER FIVE AUDIT CONFIGURATIONS
Living-off-the-land (LotL) intrusions use utilities already installed on the host, bring no foreign file and may remain invisible to antivirus scanners, so the Windows event log is often the main record of what was done. In this study, 37 read-only data-collection commands of the kind documented in joint advisory AA24-038A, 27 cmd.exe utilities and 10 PowerShell cmdlets, were executed on one Windows 11 host under five logging configurations and two privilege contexts. Under default settings, no log read back from this host held a record attributable to 33 commands, and event 4688 was not written. Process-creation auditing named the 27 utilities but no cmdlet, command-line logging added their full arguments, and PowerShell script block logging recorded the 10 cmdlets verbatim, so all 37 were covered only by the three sources together. Sysmon recorded the same 27 utilities with three fields absent from event 4688. The elevated token changed the output of 6 commands but not their records. Two consecutive spaces that the operating system wrote into the net.exe record defeated the August 2021 version of Sigma rule d95de845, which tests the whole command-line field for equality, but not its current substring version. The 15 MB PowerShell operational log held 593 records, the 10 cmdlets filled it at about 214 records per minute, and after the next pass 71 records of the previous one were gone.
Authors
- Juraev Maruf
- Boqiyev Shukurjon
Institutions
- Cyber University (JP)
- SBS CyberSecurity (United States) (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24414418
- Primary Topic
- Digital and Cyber Forensics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00