World-Boundaries and the Truth-Status of Claims
Explanations and justifications can end while further questioning remains possible. How can a claim that stabilizes at such a point function as true? This article accounts for that possibility by distinguishing the ending of an operation from how reconstruction constitutes the world of relations in which the claim functions. If input is reconstructed under constraints that the current operation cannot freely revise, and an operation can count as complete in more than one way, then the same input can yield different outcomes, including different statuses for the same claim. This article examines that consequence through two conditions specified from a functional distinction made visible in interaction with artificial systems: one completes a cognitive operation through structural consistency; the other through relations holding together sufficiently for experience or interaction to continue. Under the first condition, a locally stabilized claim has structural stability while further continuation remains possible and unfinished. Under the second, a world-boundary is constituted: continuation beyond it remains possible without remaining an unresolved condition of the claim, allowing a locally stabilized claim to function as true. The account concerns how claims function as true, not what makes them metaphysically true.
Authors
- Griselda Poe (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-1577-0732)
Institutions
- Lehman College (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24426971
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- preprint