A Nash Three-Player Game on Null Hypothesis Decisions and Perturbed Garwood Bounds for Big Health Data

IIn large-scale health datasets, classical frequentist hypothesis testing against a zero-effect null routinely yields very small p-values as sample or population size grows, even when the observed event count is modest and structurally fragile. While a recently proposed Garwood-based structural index evaluates signal resilience independently of population size, and a perturbation parameter measures how much the Garwood lower bound must shift to match the frequentist verdict, comparing these perspectives requires a formal common ground. We model the interaction among the classical null test, the perturbed Garwood index, and the bound perturbation we have proposed as a three-player game. Using Kakutani's fixed-point theorem on bounded, convex strategy spaces, we prove that a Nash equilibrium always exists, turning the equilibrium perturbation and its leverage into a diagnostic measure of the bound adjustment needed to reconcile the structural index with the frequentist decision to reject a null hypothesis until high event counts reach the saturation threshold where the game ceases to be informative.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24425648
Primary Topic
Probability and Statistical Research
Type
preprint
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preprint

A Nash Three-Player Game on Null Hypothesis Decisions and Perturbed Garwood Bounds for Big Health Data

Marco Roccetti
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Probability and Statistical Research
preprint

A Nash Three-Player Game on Null Hypothesis Decisions and Perturbed Garwood Bounds for Big Health Data

Marco Roccetti
preprint en

Abstract

IIn large-scale health datasets, classical frequentist hypothesis testing against a zero-effect null routinely yields very small p-values as sample or population size grows, even when the observed event count is modest and structurally fragile. While a recently proposed Garwood-based structural index evaluates signal resilience independently of population size, and a perturbation parameter measures how much the Garwood lower bound must shift to match the frequentist verdict, comparing these perspectives requires a formal common ground. We model the interaction among the classical null test, the perturbed Garwood index, and the bound perturbation we have proposed as a three-player game. Using Kakutani's fixed-point theorem on bounded, convex strategy spaces, we prove that a Nash equilibrium always exists, turning the equilibrium perturbation and its leverage into a diagnostic measure of the bound adjustment needed to reconcile the structural index with the frequentist decision to reject a null hypothesis until high event counts reach the saturation threshold where the game ceases to be informative.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
University of Bologna (IT)
Probability and Statistical Research
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A Nash Three-Player Game on Null Hypothesis Decisions and Perturbed Garwood Bounds for Big Health Data — Marco Roccetti · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS