Delegated Loyalty: Fiduciary Duties and Commercial Conflicts in Personal AI Agents
Delegation transfers a decision without transferring loyalty. Commercial AI providers now market personal agents that search, compare, negotiate, and buy on a user's behalf. The same providers collect merchant fees on completed purchases, sell conversation-matched advertising, and run retail stores whose goods the agent can recommend. In the early 1980s, airline reservation systems presented the same conflict, ranking the owning carrier's flights first. Federal regulators answered with rules against display bias. Common-law agency forbids undisclosed third-party benefits and adverse-party dealing, yet treats software as a tool incapable of owing duties. Any duty attaches to the provider. Seven duties follow from agency doctrine and from broker, search, and online marketplace rules. Those duties require loyalty to declared interests, conflict disclosure, a bar on undisclosed commissions, transparent ranking separated from advertising, audit trails, and portability. Without these duties, a commercial personal agent operates as the provider's representative inside the user's decisions. Keywords: Personal AI Agents, Agentic Commerce, Fiduciary Duty, Duty of Loyalty, Conflict-of-Interest Disclosure, Common Law of Agency, Information Fiduciaries, Display Bias, Airline Computer Reservation Systems, Self-Preferencing, Ranking Transparency, Undisclosed Commissions, AI Advertising Separation, Algorithmic Audit Trails, Data Portability, Authenticated Agent Protocols, Digital Markets Act, Regulation Best Interest, Consumer Protection Law, AI Governance
Authors
- Felix Velasco (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-6047-0595)
- Josie Jefferson (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0006-3330-8214)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24410238
- Primary Topic
- Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
- Type
- preprint