The devil is in the divisor: Deviations from proportionality in Dutch municipal coalition negotiations, 1998 – 2022
Under what circumstances do parties get a share of executive posts that is not directly proportional to their legislative seats? While there is strong empirical support for Gamson’s law, i.e., the distribution of executive posts in a coalition is directly proportional to the negotiating parties’ number of legislative seats, we know little about when deviations from this pattern occur. To get a grip on these deviations, we study coalition negotiations at the Dutch local level between 1998 and 2022. Major deviations from Gamson’s law are rare, and most deviations occur because no strictly proportional solution was available. Small parties are usually overrepresented and large parties are usually underrepresented. The norm of proportionality is very strong: divisor methods that distribute executive posts over parties according to their legislative seats help predict how these posts are distributed. There is no consistent evidence that parties’ bargaining power affects the direction or size of divergences.
Authors
- Simon Otjes (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8928-7591)
- Joes Gordon de Natris (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1587-7484)
Institutions
- Leiden University (NL)
- University of Groningen (NL)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Party Politics
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688261505007
- Primary Topic
- Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00