Mainstreaming Extremes, Context, and the Need for Violence
Introduction This article explores the definitional interconnections between extremism and violence and argues that, definitionally speaking, violence must always and already be implicit within extremism in order for the concept to have any comparative power. Some violence is understood to be a symptom of extreme social and political thought, but clearly not all violence is extremist and extremism does not reduce to violence (Sjoberg). Rioting and looting are interpreted as being senseless disaffection rather than as expressions of extremism (Kawalerowicz and Biggs). States can perpetrate extremist violence (Hobsbawm), but states can also sanction violence as legitimate because they monopolise the discursive terrain upon which the meaning of violence is contested (Lewis). Many of the academic fields that study extremism make an important distinction between violent and non-violent extremism-"because not all extremism is violent" (Abbas 1032). I wish to challenge this distinction and to argue that the meaningfulness of the definition of extremism depends upon violence. I will argue that violence is an implicit temporal requirement for understanding (and labelling) the ideas, the speech, and the actions of groups as extreme. The argument proceeds in three stages. First, I show why definitions that rely on centre-periphery models of the mainstream and the extreme cannot deliver the comparative, cross-contextual meaning that they promise (Tariq and Sjoberg). Second, I argue that this contextual dilemma is not merely spatial but temporal: because discourse is always being reoriented under pressure from competing powers, the position of any statement relative to a "mainstream" is only ever conditional on a discrete and brief moment in that contest. Third, I propose that this dilemma can be resolved only by anchoring extremism to something less discursively volatile than positional distance. I suggest that violence can serve this function, assuming that it is treated not as a co-present necessity, but as a longitudinal orientation, a way of speaking that points a present group towards a violent future. The Inherent Limitations of the Extremism Concept What makes violence extreme? One answer is that violence is designated extreme when it is energised by an ideological or crisis narrative that legitimates the violence and is itself considered extreme (Berger). The diagnosis of extremist violence is therefore dependent upon the description and categorisation of such narratives (Steinmetz). This dependency is the source of a persistent instability in the concept. According to the dominant "positional" understanding, the defining feature of the extremist is the distance between the position he holds on some subject and the central or mean position held within society. Inherent in this thinking is a centre-periphery logic that orients any extremist belief relative to a normative "mainstream" (Mondon): different beliefs are positioned somewhere on an ideological spectrum (Cassam; Huq). Such framing implies that removal from the centre can happen in any direction, so that the meaning of the belief is subordinate to its distance from the centre (Coleman and Bartoli). It also suggests that for any extreme belief there must be an ordinary alternative, and presumably a spectrum of further alternatives spaced between them. Extremists always exist at the fringes of these distributions, but the terms under which the relative constructs of "fringe" and "mainstream" get decided are specific to a time and a place (Neumann). Beliefs change, and so do ordinary or mainstream positions. A definition of extremism based on the norms or "centre" of a society is perilous because it excludes extremist regimes that have been centrally dominant, such as institutional racial slavery in America and Nazism in Germany (Berger). Nor does an entirely positional conceptualisation help the practical work of locating and describing extremism in the world: it is easy to imagine beliefs that are unusual without obviously being extreme, and just as easy to imagine those same beliefs becoming extreme if they acquire a fanatical or violent dimension. This framing also appears to assume that every ideological spectrum has the same structure: extreme peripheries are orientated relative to a normative centre and this structure repeats between contexts and so enables comparison (Pal; Wibisono et al.). It provides an "underlying" ideological framework to anchor analysis and offers some protection against complete moral and definitional relativism. But the model also imposes a set of assumptions about how discourse can be imagined to exist. It assumes that discursive variables are normally distributed, for instance, so that expression is concentrated at the normative centre, and it assumes that discursive distributions are symmetrical, so that for every position at one extreme of the spectrum there is an equivalent position possible at the other extreme. In making these assumptions, the framework excludes the possibility that a variable might be distributed multi-modally, with two or more mainstreams, each with their own peripheries, or asymmetrically, skewed so that the spectrum only really extends in one direction from the centre. Such assumptions distort how we encounter extremism empirically. Consider a range of possible claims related to ethno-nationalist "replacement" theories of migration, and the fact-claims to which they refer. A centre-periphery model might imply that there are possibilities for being extreme on all sides of this issue, so that a committed proponent of a replacement theory is "balanced" by someone on the opposite side, presumably a "replacer" of some sort. Globalisation and the increased flow of people across borders are empirically real; conspiracy theories of managed replacement are (currently) empirically untrue, while also being engines of networked violence (Davis). The extreme "replacer" is largely a conceptual conceit. To what extent should the discursive model be answerable to this material reality? A similar tension exists within climate extremism. The reality of the climate crisis is skewed: the facts are disproportionately weighted towards climate emergency. Under such circumstances, the assumption of equivalence between someone denying climate reality and a committed climate activist is surely problematic. Sometimes reality is itself extreme, and describing the situation faithfully cannot be equated with denying it. A positional model, in other words, requires us to know the full discursive and empirical distributions of a variable before we can locate any claim - and this knowledge is rarely available. The meaning of any text is negotiated within a given context of actors, cultural codes, assumed knowledge, power relations, and perspectives, and those conditions are always subject to change (van Dijk). Under such circumstances, the label "extremist" does not straightforwardly reveal something stable about the group being labelled; instead, its use can reveal something about the dynamics of domination that allow certain groups the power to apply the label in the first place. This is why the label always risks becoming an instrument of whoever controls the discursive terrain, rather than an analytical description of a group's security risk within a society. The Emergent Dimension of Extremism When scholars describe non-violent extremists they are referring to groups that say extreme things without concurrently being violent (Orofino and Allchorn). These are people who are ideologically extreme without resorting to extreme methods (Cassam). I contend that it is a specific type of mistake to conceptualise extremism absent violence: it is a temporal error, in that it assumes that extreme ideas are only violent if they happen to cause or to correlate with violent action immediately (Knight et al.). Relations are constructed within an analytical window of co-presence - a duration of some length that scholars construct as meaningful and feasible to map. This construction is always, to some extent, arbitrary: there is no standard for how closely in time events must occur to be considered co-present, nor is there a framework for comparing these durations between contexts. The reliance on co-presence further undermines the explanatory power of the extremism concept because it misses the emergent dimension of causality (Mead). The relationship between extreme speech and violence is rarely, if ever, conceived and studied through time - longitudinally. If discursive position alone cannot anchor extremism, what can? The orientations of ideas, speech, and social action are emergent in the sense that they interactively shape relations within a present reality and orient how that reality understands its past and anticipates its future (Puddephatt and Prus; Taylor). In my argument, extremism always and necessarily operates to orient societies towards violence, understood not loosely, as a synonym for extremism, but precisely, as a material relation that can travel between otherwise incommensurable discursive contexts. The orientation towards probable threat is already a significant dimension of extremism - the idea that holding extreme beliefs is associated with extreme actions. Berger writes that extremists believe that "success or survival is inseparable from the need for hostile action against an out-group" (44). Such beliefs are encoded within crisis narratives, which can be written as conspiracy theories or as apocalyptic and dystopian visions. In narrative studies, "what constitutes a narrative is the representation of a series or a sequence of events" (Rudrum 196)-a temporal sequence to explain and orient a group within an emergent environment. A narrative can be "defined as a generalisable, constructed and selective depiction of reality across time" (Dennison 1). Ideology and narrative intertwine when groups produce culture to
Authors
- Philip Pond (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5712-240X)
Institutions
- The University of Melbourne (AU)
Publication Details
- Journal
- M/C Journal
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3331
- Primary Topic
- Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00