Small Language Models as Industrial Incident Investigators: A Verifier-Checked Negative Result on a Simulated Oil-and-Gas Separator
Language models are proposed for alert investigation in operational-technology (OT) security, but fluent explanations establish neither evidential fidelity nor decision reliability. We evaluate small open-weight models (Qwen2.5-1.5B, 3B and 7B) as incident investigators on a stylised two-phase oil-and-gas separator simulation, using a deterministic claim verifier with a known-true control arm and verdicts scored against simulator ground truth. On a held-out split no model exceeded an always-“attack” baseline (78% of episodes) by more than two episodes. The 1.5B and 3B models emitted one verdict almost throughout; the 7B model, given synthetic provenance, fell from 0.626 to 0.356 accuracy, treating a silent IDS as evidence of benign activity. All three models followed one injected operator note on every attack episode (69/69, 69/69, 136/136). Of the 7B model’s structured claims, 16.7% cited a nonexistent evidence item or attached a metric to the wrong item, against 1.6% for the control; a further 14.5% asserted a direction for a non-delta feature, a category the control shows to be largely a schema-use artefact. Headline defect rates on identical generations ranged from 18% to 45% depending on the counting rule. A physics-consistency twin detected weak attacks that rules and an isolation forest missed (0.983; 0.996 on independent seeds), but only while its model was nearly exact. We explain each result, state what it does and does not show, and derive a concrete research agenda from it. All results are simulation-only; the failed first run and every post hoc amendment are documented.
Authors
- Mustafa S. Aljumaily (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7886-9537)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.66977/xsci.2611.003k
- Primary Topic
- Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Type
- preprint