The Extreme within the Mainstream: Why the Societal Centre Is Not a Bulwark against Far-Right Extremism

Introduction A key feature of political extremism is the centrality of rigid us-versus-them thinking. Sometimes this is described explicitly as a marker of extremism (Grossman et al.; Mirahmadi); in other cases, it is reflected in the way extremists are defined through their stance on and/or behaviour towards their ingroup and what they regard as outgroups. The prominent definition by US scholar J.M. Berger (6), for example, conceptualises extremism as “a spectrum of beliefs in which an in-group’s success is inseparable from negative acts against an out-group. Negative acts can include verbal attacks and diminishment, discriminatory behavior, or violence”. This applies also to far-right extremism, which this article is particularly focussed on. Many definitions of far-right extremism are based on a set of ideological markers grounded in identity-based distinctions, exclusion, and superiority claims along cultural and/or racialised lines, complemented by authoritarian, anti-democratic positions (Mudde; Carter). Identifying with an ingroup and hostility towards outgroups are central. “Anti-ism unambiguously marks out the enemy, [and] it reinforces the ‘us’”, as Jamin (47) argues in his work on far-right extremism. Ironically, however, those who oppose far-right extremist ideologies and seek to tackle these exclusionary-nationalist movements also commonly apply rigid us-versus-them categories. Far-right extremists (“them”) are regarded as a threat to “our” political system of liberal democracy, to the cohesiveness of “our” society, and the safety of “our” communities and public sphere. It’s the far-right extremists who are othered. This reflects an attempt to locate both the illiberal radical and the anti-democratic extremist far right (Pirro) as distinct and separate from where we see ourselves at the centre of an allegedly democratically minded polity and inclusive (or at least tolerant) liberal society. “Radical”, “extreme”, or “extremism” are relational terms; they only make sense when we are able to say what is not radical or extreme and what falls within the boundaries of accepted norms. The public debate often relies on the term “mainstream” to refer to this rather ominous and poorly demarcated societal centre. Situating radicals and extremists outside the mainstream helps sanitise this centre while reassuring ourselves of being the “good guys”. This article critiques such a positioning, arguing that the societal centre, or mainstream society, is not a reliable bulwark against far-right extremism, and that far-right extremism cannot be confined to the edges of society. It draws on the work of scholars like Brown, Mondon, and Winter who have posited that far-right positions have moved into the broader public discourse in a process often described as mainstreaming (Brown, Mondon, and Winter; Mondon and Winter). Against this backdrop, this article seeks to show that the mainstream-fringe division not only commonly fails to reflect the empirical realities but is also counter-productive in providing a clear foundation for practical approaches to tackle the appeal of far-right extremist groups, communities, and narratives. The article offers a critical exploration of the conceptualisation of the mainstream as the claimed antithesis of – or even a social and political antidote against – far-right extremism. This critique is presented in three ways: (1) through general elaborations on the meaning of the mainstream in the context of value pluralism, polarisation, and social change. This is followed by a short discussion of (2) the arguably low level of liberal democratic commitment in the polity and the presence of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes (also) in the societal centre, and (3) widespread ideological, social, and psychological conditions in the broader society that increase far-right susceptibility. The article concludes by briefly discussing some implications for effectively addressing far-right extremism. What Mainstream? Value Plurality, Polarisation and Shifts over Time Contemporary democratic societies are profoundly pluralistic. People from different backgrounds, with various political convictions, social values, and life experiences often have divergent perspectives; we can safely assume that many would disagree on a variety of issues. The political scientist Chantal Mouffe (15) highlighted this “ineradicable pluralism of value” more than 25 years ago, describing it as “an impossibility” to overcome the “us/them opposition” that such a plurality ordinarily entails. This pluralism of values – and with it, the challenges to finding consensus on what “mainstream” means – has continued to further expand since then. While the mainstream is frequently referenced, it remains a vague, elusive, and poorly defined system of allegedly widely shared values and principles, both in the public and political debate as well as in academia (Brown, Mondon, and Winter). Against the backdrop of ongoing contestations of what constitutes the mainstream and who can claim to represent it, the term seems to primarily reflect normative claims rather than an empirical reality in a highly pluralistic society where a broad consensus on many matters – from climate change and immigration to recognition of First Nations peoples – remains elusive. Notwithstanding this tension between normative claims and empirical facts, the notion of the mainstream is being used to draw legal and socio-political lines of exclusion and inclusion, belonging and non-belonging, and between us and them, the latter including, among other groups, those who hold far right or other “extremist” positions. The mainstream is fractured even more in an environment of social, political, and affective polarisation. Growing socio-economic inequalities, for example, result in diminishing spaces of joint experiences and a drifting apart of lived realities where people interact with each other. This is exacerbated by often algorithmically curated online spaces, which also affect our offline worlds (Oksanen et al.). In such an environment, it may be more accurate to speak of mainstreams in plural. What further complicates the notion of the mainstream is that norms are not static; the mainstream constantly evolves – and not necessarily in linear, progressive ways. What used to be considered normal, for example, a racist White Australia immigration regime or criminalisation of homosexuality, is now regarded, arguably by a majority, as inappropriate or even “extreme”. What used to be seen as radical has become legal and normal, such as same-sex marriage. Core far-right claims of white nationalism, male dominance, and exclusion of queer communities are regarded as extreme today because they are out of time, but they refer to a mainstream of the past, or what Taggart (257) described as a “heartland, … constructed retrospectively from the past”, which “unlike utopias, … has already been lived”. This is illustrated by the common arguments by far-right actors, claiming normalcy of their ideological agendas, and arguing that it’s not them who have changed, but the world around them (Peucker et al.) – a position captured by a 2026 opinion piece in the right-wing, conservative Spectator Australia titled, “When Did Normal Become ‘Far-Might’?” (Mather). Is the Societal Centre a Reliable Bulwark of Liberal Democracy? In the introduction to their German study on authoritarianism, a team of researchers describe the common perception of the societal centre as a “space of respectability” and a “protective space for democracy” as “wishful thinking” (Decker et al. 15). This seems to be confirmed by recent election successes of far-right populist parties with illiberal political agendas in various western countries, and of far-right parties such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which has been classified as “proven right-wing extremist” by the German domestic intelligence agency Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (which, tellingly, translates to Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). Large proportions of citizens across various democracies appear undeterred by the overtly illiberal, exclusionary, and often revisionist and authoritarian agendas of these parties. In the German case, even the fact that the AfD is officially categorised as a far-right extremist organisation has not stopped their electoral gains, reaching over 40 per cent in some areas and German states. Electoral successes of illiberal radical or even extreme far-right parties suggest that a large proportion of citizens are not intrinsically committed to liberal democratic principles and values. Instead, as American political scientist William Galston argues, most people support democracy only as long as it delivers economic growth and mobility, social welfare, safety, and protection from external threats. In what Galston calls a “liberal-democratic bargain”, citizens are prepared to “defer to political and polity elites on key decisions shaping economic policy, national-security strategies, and systems of governance”. Once governments fail to keep their side of the bargain to ensure “prosperous, peaceful and secure lives”, however, support for liberal democracy drops sharply. Liberal democracy, as Glaston writes, is for many like “a tree known by its fruits. Once it ceases to produce the expected crop, all bets are off” (24). Attitudinal studies across various western democracies have highlighted that a significant part of the population – certainly well beyond the societal fringes – hold authoritarian positions and lack support for basic democratic processes and principles. According to representative US surveys, for example, between 25 and 30% of Americans support “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections” (Drutman et al.; MacWilliams). A recent Australian survey by the Lowy Institute found that, while a majority of 73% p

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M/C Journal
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2026-11-21
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https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3336
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Populism, Right-Wing Movements
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article

The Extreme within the Mainstream: Why the Societal Centre Is Not a Bulwark against Far-Right Extremism

Mario Peucker
M/C Journal
Populism, Right-Wing Movements
article

The Extreme within the Mainstream: Why the Societal Centre Is Not a Bulwark against Far-Right Extremism

Mario Peucker
article en

Abstract

Introduction A key feature of political extremism is the centrality of rigid us-versus-them thinking. Sometimes this is described explicitly as a marker of extremism (Grossman et al.; Mirahmadi); in other cases, it is reflected in the way extremists are defined through their stance on and/or behaviour towards their ingroup and what they regard as outgroups. The prominent definition by US scholar J.M. Berger (6), for example, conceptualises extremism as “a spectrum of beliefs in which an in-group’s success is inseparable from negative acts against an out-group. Negative acts can include verbal attacks and diminishment, discriminatory behavior, or violence”. This applies also to far-right extremism, which this article is particularly focussed on. Many definitions of far-right extremism are based on a set of ideological markers grounded in identity-based distinctions, exclusion, and superiority claims along cultural and/or racialised lines, complemented by authoritarian, anti-democratic positions (Mudde; Carter). Identifying with an ingroup and hostility towards outgroups are central. “Anti-ism unambiguously marks out the enemy, [and] it reinforces the ‘us’”, as Jamin (47) argues in his work on far-right extremism. Ironically, however, those who oppose far-right extremist ideologies and seek to tackle these exclusionary-nationalist movements also commonly apply rigid us-versus-them categories. Far-right extremists (“them”) are regarded as a threat to “our” political system of liberal democracy, to the cohesiveness of “our” society, and the safety of “our” communities and public sphere. It’s the far-right extremists who are othered. This reflects an attempt to locate both the illiberal radical and the anti-democratic extremist far right (Pirro) as distinct and separate from where we see ourselves at the centre of an allegedly democratically minded polity and inclusive (or at least tolerant) liberal society. “Radical”, “extreme”, or “extremism” are relational terms; they only make sense when we are able to say what is not radical or extreme and what falls within the boundaries of accepted norms. The public debate often relies on the term “mainstream” to refer to this rather ominous and poorly demarcated societal centre. Situating radicals and extremists outside the mainstream helps sanitise this centre while reassuring ourselves of being the “good guys”. This article critiques such a positioning, arguing that the societal centre, or mainstream society, is not a reliable bulwark against far-right extremism, and that far-right extremism cannot be confined to the edges of society. It draws on the work of scholars like Brown, Mondon, and Winter who have posited that far-right positions have moved into the broader public discourse in a process often described as mainstreaming (Brown, Mondon, and Winter; Mondon and Winter). Against this backdrop, this article seeks to show that the mainstream-fringe division not only commonly fails to reflect the empirical realities but is also counter-productive in providing a clear foundation for practical approaches to tackle the appeal of far-right extremist groups, communities, and narratives. The article offers a critical exploration of the conceptualisation of the mainstream as the claimed antithesis of – or even a social and political antidote against – far-right extremism. This critique is presented in three ways: (1) through general elaborations on the meaning of the mainstream in the context of value pluralism, polarisation, and social change. This is followed by a short discussion of (2) the arguably low level of liberal democratic commitment in the polity and the presence of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes (also) in the societal centre, and (3) widespread ideological, social, and psychological conditions in the broader society that increase far-right susceptibility. The article concludes by briefly discussing some implications for effectively addressing far-right extremism. What Mainstream? Value Plurality, Polarisation and Shifts over Time Contemporary democratic societies are profoundly pluralistic. People from different backgrounds, with various political convictions, social values, and life experiences often have divergent perspectives; we can safely assume that many would disagree on a variety of issues. The political scientist Chantal Mouffe (15) highlighted this “ineradicable pluralism of value” more than 25 years ago, describing it as “an impossibility” to overcome the “us/them opposition” that such a plurality ordinarily entails. This pluralism of values – and with it, the challenges to finding consensus on what “mainstream” means – has continued to further expand since then. While the mainstream is frequently referenced, it remains a vague, elusive, and poorly defined system of allegedly widely shared values and principles, both in the public and political debate as well as in academia (Brown, Mondon, and Winter). Against the backdrop of ongoing contestations of what constitutes the mainstream and who can claim to represent it, the term seems to primarily reflect normative claims rather than an empirical reality in a highly pluralistic society where a broad consensus on many matters – from climate change and immigration to recognition of First Nations peoples – remains elusive. Notwithstanding this tension between normative claims and empirical facts, the notion of the mainstream is being used to draw legal and socio-political lines of exclusion and inclusion, belonging and non-belonging, and between us and them, the latter including, among other groups, those who hold far right or other “extremist” positions. The mainstream is fractured even more in an environment of social, political, and affective polarisation. Growing socio-economic inequalities, for example, result in diminishing spaces of joint experiences and a drifting apart of lived realities where people interact with each other. This is exacerbated by often algorithmically curated online spaces, which also affect our offline worlds (Oksanen et al.). In such an environment, it may be more accurate to speak of mainstreams in plural. What further complicates the notion of the mainstream is that norms are not static; the mainstream constantly evolves – and not necessarily in linear, progressive ways. What used to be considered normal, for example, a racist White Australia immigration regime or criminalisation of homosexuality, is now regarded, arguably by a majority, as inappropriate or even “extreme”. What used to be seen as radical has become legal and normal, such as same-sex marriage. Core far-right claims of white nationalism, male dominance, and exclusion of queer communities are regarded as extreme today because they are out of time, but they refer to a mainstream of the past, or what Taggart (257) described as a “heartland, … constructed retrospectively from the past”, which “unlike utopias, … has already been lived”. This is illustrated by the common arguments by far-right actors, claiming normalcy of their ideological agendas, and arguing that it’s not them who have changed, but the world around them (Peucker et al.) – a position captured by a 2026 opinion piece in the right-wing, conservative Spectator Australia titled, “When Did Normal Become ‘Far-Might’?” (Mather). Is the Societal Centre a Reliable Bulwark of Liberal Democracy? In the introduction to their German study on authoritarianism, a team of researchers describe the common perception of the societal centre as a “space of respectability” and a “protective space for democracy” as “wishful thinking” (Decker et al. 15). This seems to be confirmed by recent election successes of far-right populist parties with illiberal political agendas in various western countries, and of far-right parties such as the German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which has been classified as “proven right-wing extremist” by the German domestic intelligence agency Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (which, tellingly, translates to Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution). Large proportions of citizens across various democracies appear undeterred by the overtly illiberal, exclusionary, and often revisionist and authoritarian agendas of these parties. In the German case, even the fact that the AfD is officially categorised as a far-right extremist organisation has not stopped their electoral gains, reaching over 40 per cent in some areas and German states. Electoral successes of illiberal radical or even extreme far-right parties suggest that a large proportion of citizens are not intrinsically committed to liberal democratic principles and values. Instead, as American political scientist William Galston argues, most people support democracy only as long as it delivers economic growth and mobility, social welfare, safety, and protection from external threats. In what Galston calls a “liberal-democratic bargain”, citizens are prepared to “defer to political and polity elites on key decisions shaping economic policy, national-security strategies, and systems of governance”. Once governments fail to keep their side of the bargain to ensure “prosperous, peaceful and secure lives”, however, support for liberal democracy drops sharply. Liberal democracy, as Glaston writes, is for many like “a tree known by its fruits. Once it ceases to produce the expected crop, all bets are off” (24). Attitudinal studies across various western democracies have highlighted that a significant part of the population – certainly well beyond the societal fringes – hold authoritarian positions and lack support for basic democratic processes and principles. According to representative US surveys, for example, between 25 and 30% of Americans support “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections” (Drutman et al.; MacWilliams). A recent Australian survey by the Lowy Institute found that, while a majority of 73% p

M/C JournalVol. 29(6)
Victoria University (AU)
Populism, Right-Wing Movements
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