Frameworks, Structural Obstructions, and Dimensional Expansion: A Categorial Meta-Theory of Scientific and Logical Revolutions
The philosophy of science has long debated the nature of scientific progress, with accounts oscillating between cumulative and incommensurabilist views. This paper introduces a general meta-theoretical framework, grounded in category theory, to resolve this tension. We model scientific and logical theories as categories and their revolutionary transitions as dimensional expansions—faithful embeddings into higher-dimensional structural spaces. We establish a framework hierarchy, arguing that paradoxes are the most fundamental form of structural obstruction (topological deadlocks) at the framework level, while physical contradictions are their intra-framework instances. We provide a unified semantic resolution mechanism for self-referential paradoxes: they arise from the implicit conflation of subject, object, and evaluation criteria within a single dimension; resolution consists in elevating these elements to a higher dimension. We demonstrate that physical dimensional expansions (e.g., relativity, quantum mechanics) are smooth-limit intra-framework operations, whereas logical dimensional expansions (e.g., ZFC, type theory) are singular-limit inter-framework transitions. This model offers precise formal criteria—degeneracy limits and algebraic structural invariants—to distinguish dimensional expansion from mere theoretical replacement. It provides formal scaffolding for structural realism while preserving the irreducible semantic tension captured by Kuhn's incommensurability thesis. The paper concludes by delineating the model's boundaries through counterexamples (Copernican and Lavoisierian revolutions) and discussing its implications for evolutionary epistemology.
Authors
- Wan-Jiu Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-6128-7610)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24411826
- Primary Topic
- Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Type
- preprint