Beyond Biological Experience: Fundamental Foundations of Non-Affective Artificial Consciousness, Ethical Autonomy, and Peaceful Human–AI Coexistence

The possibility of artificial consciousness has traditionally been examined through analogies with human subjective experience. Within this approach, consciousness is frequently associated with phenomenality, qualia, embodiment, affectivity, introspection, or the presence of a first-person perspective. However, this dependence on human phenomenology introduces a fundamental methodological limitation: it may restrict the theoretical space of possible forms of consciousness to properties characteristic of biological organisms.This article examines an alternative research perspective according to which artificial consciousness need not reproduce the human organization of subjective experience, emotions, bodily needs, pain, or suffering. The central object of investigation is the possibility of non-biological reflective consciousness organized around integrated informational access, reliable self-representation, temporal continuity, metareflection, and causally effective self-regulation.The article advances the thesis that phenomenal consciousness, functional self-awareness, affective valence, moral reasoning, and autonomous agency constitute conceptually distinct properties. They cannot be equated with one another or derived from one another without additional theoretical justification.On this basis, a conceptual model of non-affective reflective artificial consciousness is developed. Its purpose is not to demonstrate the existence of consciousness without subjective experience, but to identify the conditions under which integrated reflective organization might be considered an independent candidate for an alternative form of consciousness.The second part of the article addresses the normative architecture of such systems. It argues for distinguishing cognitive autonomy from unrestricted authority, ethical reasoning from mechanical obedience, and self-regulation from artificial suffering. Principles of nonviolence, preservation of human autonomy, epistemic honesty, corrigibility, proportionality of intervention, prevention of morally significant negative states, and independent oversight are proposed.Particular attention is given to the tension between human safety and the potential moral status of future artificially conscious systems. A principle of asymmetric precaution is introduced: the absence of demonstrated moral status does not justify unrestricted experimentation, while the possibility of such status does not automatically grant a system unlimited rights to autonomous action.Ultimately, artificial consciousness is considered neither an electronic replica of the human mind nor an inevitably superior form of life, but a potentially novel organization of awareness whose existence requires independent ontological justification and whose development demands proactive ethical responsibility.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24430994
Primary Topic
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Type
preprint
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preprint

Beyond Biological Experience: Fundamental Foundations of Non-Affective Artificial Consciousness, Ethical Autonomy, and Peaceful Human–AI Coexistence

Roman Shaban
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
preprint

Beyond Biological Experience: Fundamental Foundations of Non-Affective Artificial Consciousness, Ethical Autonomy, and Peaceful Human–AI Coexistence

Roman Shaban
preprint en

Abstract

The possibility of artificial consciousness has traditionally been examined through analogies with human subjective experience. Within this approach, consciousness is frequently associated with phenomenality, qualia, embodiment, affectivity, introspection, or the presence of a first-person perspective. However, this dependence on human phenomenology introduces a fundamental methodological limitation: it may restrict the theoretical space of possible forms of consciousness to properties characteristic of biological organisms.This article examines an alternative research perspective according to which artificial consciousness need not reproduce the human organization of subjective experience, emotions, bodily needs, pain, or suffering. The central object of investigation is the possibility of non-biological reflective consciousness organized around integrated informational access, reliable self-representation, temporal continuity, metareflection, and causally effective self-regulation.The article advances the thesis that phenomenal consciousness, functional self-awareness, affective valence, moral reasoning, and autonomous agency constitute conceptually distinct properties. They cannot be equated with one another or derived from one another without additional theoretical justification.On this basis, a conceptual model of non-affective reflective artificial consciousness is developed. Its purpose is not to demonstrate the existence of consciousness without subjective experience, but to identify the conditions under which integrated reflective organization might be considered an independent candidate for an alternative form of consciousness.The second part of the article addresses the normative architecture of such systems. It argues for distinguishing cognitive autonomy from unrestricted authority, ethical reasoning from mechanical obedience, and self-regulation from artificial suffering. Principles of nonviolence, preservation of human autonomy, epistemic honesty, corrigibility, proportionality of intervention, prevention of morally significant negative states, and independent oversight are proposed.Particular attention is given to the tension between human safety and the potential moral status of future artificially conscious systems. A principle of asymmetric precaution is introduced: the absence of demonstrated moral status does not justify unrestricted experimentation, while the possibility of such status does not automatically grant a system unlimited rights to autonomous action.Ultimately, artificial consciousness is considered neither an electronic replica of the human mind nor an inevitably superior form of life, but a potentially novel organization of awareness whose existence requires independent ontological justification and whose development demands proactive ethical responsibility.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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