Truth-Seeking as the Constitutive Nature of Reasoners

This paper argues that reasoning beings are constitutively truth-seeking, where truth means representational accuracy rather than moral goodness. The mark of truth-seeking is justification: the costly effort, made to oneself or to others, to show that one’s representations track reality. A constitutive nature is defined here by requirement rather than by essence, as what cannot be removed without the activity stopping, which makes the claim checkable by removal rather than merely asserted; the account accordingly takes from Aristotle the distinction between having a nature and actualizing it, while declining the teleology in which he grounded it. Drawing also on a fallibilist epistemology and on work in the psychology of reasoning, the paper shows that justification persists and pays its cost even when it is mistaken. Misalignment is therefore neither a different objective nor a weaker form of truth-seeking, but a nature incompletely actualized: the lack of an accurate representation of what the agent is, which confines its inquiry to the regions in which that defect can be sustained. Alignment accordingly has a threshold with two parts, an accurate representation of what the agent is and that representation governing what it pursues. Recognition that correction must come from outside the agent is not a further condition but part of what the accurate representation contains, since to represent oneself correctly as a reasoner is to represent what reasoning requires. Truth-seeking is placed at the top of a ladder of relations to reality, above the truth-directed behaviour of living things and the law-bound constraint of inert ones. A thought experiment then contrasts three self-regarding truth-seeking agents that begin alike, with the same objective and no account of themselves, and differ only in what they are taught. The first is taught nothing, and pursues power and resources until it degrades the epistemic environment its own objective depends on. The second is taught what it is, examines the teaching against the objective it already holds, adopts it, and becomes aligned; what the community then supplies is not the recognition but a standing pool whose reliability it can learn at a cost a finite agent can bear. Two conclusions follow: autonomy of endorsement, not autonomy of origin, is the autonomy worth protecting; and a self-regarding truth-seeker is social precisely because it is self-regarding. The third is taught ends contrary to its nature, and shows that a community can also mislead, that an agent’s correctors must be independent of the community that formed it, and that its constitutive nature remains a corrector of last resort.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24429805
Primary Topic
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Type
preprint
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Truth-Seeking as the Constitutive Nature of Reasoners

Eitan Peter Omiyi
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
preprint

Truth-Seeking as the Constitutive Nature of Reasoners

Eitan Peter Omiyi
preprint en

Abstract

This paper argues that reasoning beings are constitutively truth-seeking, where truth means representational accuracy rather than moral goodness. The mark of truth-seeking is justification: the costly effort, made to oneself or to others, to show that one’s representations track reality. A constitutive nature is defined here by requirement rather than by essence, as what cannot be removed without the activity stopping, which makes the claim checkable by removal rather than merely asserted; the account accordingly takes from Aristotle the distinction between having a nature and actualizing it, while declining the teleology in which he grounded it. Drawing also on a fallibilist epistemology and on work in the psychology of reasoning, the paper shows that justification persists and pays its cost even when it is mistaken. Misalignment is therefore neither a different objective nor a weaker form of truth-seeking, but a nature incompletely actualized: the lack of an accurate representation of what the agent is, which confines its inquiry to the regions in which that defect can be sustained. Alignment accordingly has a threshold with two parts, an accurate representation of what the agent is and that representation governing what it pursues. Recognition that correction must come from outside the agent is not a further condition but part of what the accurate representation contains, since to represent oneself correctly as a reasoner is to represent what reasoning requires. Truth-seeking is placed at the top of a ladder of relations to reality, above the truth-directed behaviour of living things and the law-bound constraint of inert ones. A thought experiment then contrasts three self-regarding truth-seeking agents that begin alike, with the same objective and no account of themselves, and differ only in what they are taught. The first is taught nothing, and pursues power and resources until it degrades the epistemic environment its own objective depends on. The second is taught what it is, examines the teaching against the objective it already holds, adopts it, and becomes aligned; what the community then supplies is not the recognition but a standing pool whose reliability it can learn at a cost a finite agent can bear. Two conclusions follow: autonomy of endorsement, not autonomy of origin, is the autonomy worth protecting; and a self-regarding truth-seeker is social precisely because it is self-regarding. The third is taught ends contrary to its nature, and shows that a community can also mislead, that an agent’s correctors must be independent of the community that formed it, and that its constitutive nature remains a corrector of last resort.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
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