On Moral Profundity
A prominent strand of anticognitivism about art grants that artworks may yield cognitive benefits, yet denies that such benefits bear on artistic merit. I call this the separation thesis. This article argues that the thesis reaches its limit in the case of moral profundity. On my account, a morally profound work resists a fluent moral verdict while keeping the demand for judgment in force, sustaining engagement with practical reasons that remain genuinely live on more than one side. The cognitive value of such works lies in a form of moral training. They discipline our capacity to maintain steadiness under unresolved practical conflict, calling on us to recalibrate moral attention and to take up opposed standpoints under affective pressure. This training is not an aftereffect of appreciation. The same organization of practical reasons that makes a work artistically admirable as morally profound also solicits and disciplines the relevant cognitive exercise. Moral profundity thus shows that cognitive and artistic value are, in one significant case, constitutively entangled.
Authors
- Juhan Yoon (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-6039-8196)
Institutions
- Daegu University (KR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpag047
- Primary Topic
- Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00