The Price of Keeping the Future Open: Calibrated Anticipation at the Junction of Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason

AuthorsKriger, Boris — Information Physics Institute, Gosport, Hampshire, United Kingdom; Institute of Integrative and Interdisciplinary Research, Toronto, Canada — ORCID 0009-0001-0034-2903 Resource typePublication / Preprint Theoretical rationality is assessed on credences, practical reason on choices, and expected-utility theory is supposed to carry the first into the second without changing it. This paper argues that the transmission fails at a specific point: the allocation of preparation (attention, rehearsal, resources and readiness) across the futures an agent considers possible. Preparation is a standing practical state with a running cost, and holding several futures open is costly to the one who holds them. A minimal model charges an affective price proportional to the Shannon entropy of the preparation allocation, in addition to a convex cost of being unprepared and a linear cost of dwelling on distressing scenarios. Four results follow. (1) For every positive price, every single-future commitment is a strict local optimum, so a committed mind cannot be moved by small corrections; above a threshold, commitment is also globally optimal. (2) The future selected maximizes stakes-weighted probability minus distress, so an improbable catastrophe can win, and when distress is high the agent commits instead to the pleasant future. (3) Collapse is felt as relief in proportion to the uncertainty removed, independently of whether the selected future is good or bad: relief is the price of uncertainty, not evidence about the future. (4) If the committed agent counts disconfirmations at reduced weight, its credence settles above the true rate, and below an explicit threshold the commitment sustains itself. Practical commitment then returns to corrupt belief. The model is distinguished from its nearest relatives (preference for early resolution of uncertainty, anticipatory utility, optimal expectations, entropy-penalized worst-case beliefs, axiomatized catastrophic attention, the entropy model of uncertainty-related anxiety) by the object on which the price falls. It falls on preparation, not on beliefs, information or the evaluation of acts. This yields the decisive empirical prediction: early in an episode preparation is concentrated while credence remains calibrated, and credence drifts only afterwards, at a rate governed by the discount. The results are developed as a series of forks, each with both branches argued and a testable dissociation between credence and preparation: - whether the price of open uncertainty is a reason or a bias, which reconciles James and Clifford: James is right about preparation, Clifford about the discount, and the commitment James licenses is what produces the discount Clifford condemns; - whether collapse occurs in belief or in preparation, in relation to Cohen's separation of rational from justified belief, the belief/acceptance distinction (Bratman; L. J. Cohen), and the sense of understanding as relief (Trout; Gurova on "understanding it makes it normal" and on explanations that add inferences); - whether peers disagree in credence or in commitment, with consequences for conciliationism and steadfastness; - how a community of individually collapsed scientists can be calibrated as a whole through heterogeneity of stakes (Kuhn, Kitcher, Zollman), and how uniform stakes produce collective collapse; - a Davidsonian rationalization of the catastrophist without a partitioned mind; - whether pragmatic and moral encroachment act on belief or on preparation, together with the moral neutrality of the mechanism, which makes harmful plans misfire as readily as good ones. Normative conclusions within a given frame are a floor on preparation, alternation, the full-weight rule for disconfirmations, and the re-examination of commitments made when the price was high. The paper then identifies three ways out of a priced frame. The first lowers the price: Shestov's groundlessness and Keats's negative capability read as a cultivated capacity to hold uncertainty open, with an account of where it pays and where it costs. The second lowers the stakes, by taking the lowest position. The third leaves the frame through orthogonal displacement: since the set of futures is a description rather than a given, a change of description replaces the space on which the allocation lives instead of fighting the entropy price. Wisdom, understood as orthogonal displacement, and calibration then appear as two forms of one capacity: keeping open what a priced mind closes. Calibration emerges as a theoretical norm that only practical reason can enforce. The paper builds on the author's earlier work on entropy-driven collapse of anticipation, on the books "Why We Misread the Consequences of Our Actions" and "Escaping the Dark Paths of the Mind", and on the structural theory of wisdom and orders of orthogonality. Submitted to the Balkan Journal of Philosophy, special thematic issue (2027) "Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason". Keywordscalibration; anticipation; entropy; theoretical rationality; practical reason; ethics of belief; James; Clifford; acceptance; peer disagreement; division of cognitive labour; Kuhn; Davidson; pragmatic encroachment; moral encroachment; sense of understanding; relief; repetitive negative thinking; groundlessness; Shestov; negative capability; orthogonal displacement; wisdom; decision theory Notes Preprint. Submitted to the Balkan Journal of Philosophy (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), special thematic issue (2027) "Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason". Approx. 7,600 words including abstract, keywords and references; APA style. Related identifiers (cites) https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24235499 — The Price of Certainty https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20100022 — Orders of Orthogonality https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20112021 — The Structural Theory of Wisdom LicenseCC BY 4.0

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Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
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2026-11-21
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https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24429688
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Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
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preprint
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The Price of Keeping the Future Open: Calibrated Anticipation at the Junction of Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason

Boris Kriger
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
preprint

The Price of Keeping the Future Open: Calibrated Anticipation at the Junction of Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason

Boris Kriger
preprint en

Abstract

AuthorsKriger, Boris — Information Physics Institute, Gosport, Hampshire, United Kingdom; Institute of Integrative and Interdisciplinary Research, Toronto, Canada — ORCID 0009-0001-0034-2903 Resource typePublication / Preprint Theoretical rationality is assessed on credences, practical reason on choices, and expected-utility theory is supposed to carry the first into the second without changing it. This paper argues that the transmission fails at a specific point: the allocation of preparation (attention, rehearsal, resources and readiness) across the futures an agent considers possible. Preparation is a standing practical state with a running cost, and holding several futures open is costly to the one who holds them. A minimal model charges an affective price proportional to the Shannon entropy of the preparation allocation, in addition to a convex cost of being unprepared and a linear cost of dwelling on distressing scenarios. Four results follow. (1) For every positive price, every single-future commitment is a strict local optimum, so a committed mind cannot be moved by small corrections; above a threshold, commitment is also globally optimal. (2) The future selected maximizes stakes-weighted probability minus distress, so an improbable catastrophe can win, and when distress is high the agent commits instead to the pleasant future. (3) Collapse is felt as relief in proportion to the uncertainty removed, independently of whether the selected future is good or bad: relief is the price of uncertainty, not evidence about the future. (4) If the committed agent counts disconfirmations at reduced weight, its credence settles above the true rate, and below an explicit threshold the commitment sustains itself. Practical commitment then returns to corrupt belief. The model is distinguished from its nearest relatives (preference for early resolution of uncertainty, anticipatory utility, optimal expectations, entropy-penalized worst-case beliefs, axiomatized catastrophic attention, the entropy model of uncertainty-related anxiety) by the object on which the price falls. It falls on preparation, not on beliefs, information or the evaluation of acts. This yields the decisive empirical prediction: early in an episode preparation is concentrated while credence remains calibrated, and credence drifts only afterwards, at a rate governed by the discount. The results are developed as a series of forks, each with both branches argued and a testable dissociation between credence and preparation: - whether the price of open uncertainty is a reason or a bias, which reconciles James and Clifford: James is right about preparation, Clifford about the discount, and the commitment James licenses is what produces the discount Clifford condemns; - whether collapse occurs in belief or in preparation, in relation to Cohen's separation of rational from justified belief, the belief/acceptance distinction (Bratman; L. J. Cohen), and the sense of understanding as relief (Trout; Gurova on "understanding it makes it normal" and on explanations that add inferences); - whether peers disagree in credence or in commitment, with consequences for conciliationism and steadfastness; - how a community of individually collapsed scientists can be calibrated as a whole through heterogeneity of stakes (Kuhn, Kitcher, Zollman), and how uniform stakes produce collective collapse; - a Davidsonian rationalization of the catastrophist without a partitioned mind; - whether pragmatic and moral encroachment act on belief or on preparation, together with the moral neutrality of the mechanism, which makes harmful plans misfire as readily as good ones. Normative conclusions within a given frame are a floor on preparation, alternation, the full-weight rule for disconfirmations, and the re-examination of commitments made when the price was high. The paper then identifies three ways out of a priced frame. The first lowers the price: Shestov's groundlessness and Keats's negative capability read as a cultivated capacity to hold uncertainty open, with an account of where it pays and where it costs. The second lowers the stakes, by taking the lowest position. The third leaves the frame through orthogonal displacement: since the set of futures is a description rather than a given, a change of description replaces the space on which the allocation lives instead of fighting the entropy price. Wisdom, understood as orthogonal displacement, and calibration then appear as two forms of one capacity: keeping open what a priced mind closes. Calibration emerges as a theoretical norm that only practical reason can enforce. The paper builds on the author's earlier work on entropy-driven collapse of anticipation, on the books "Why We Misread the Consequences of Our Actions" and "Escaping the Dark Paths of the Mind", and on the structural theory of wisdom and orders of orthogonality. Submitted to the Balkan Journal of Philosophy, special thematic issue (2027) "Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason". Keywordscalibration; anticipation; entropy; theoretical rationality; practical reason; ethics of belief; James; Clifford; acceptance; peer disagreement; division of cognitive labour; Kuhn; Davidson; pragmatic encroachment; moral encroachment; sense of understanding; relief; repetitive negative thinking; groundlessness; Shestov; negative capability; orthogonal displacement; wisdom; decision theory Notes Preprint. Submitted to the Balkan Journal of Philosophy (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), special thematic issue (2027) "Theoretical Rationality and Practical Reason". Approx. 7,600 words including abstract, keywords and references; APA style. Related identifiers (cites) https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24235499 — The Price of Certainty https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20100022 — Orders of Orthogonality https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20112021 — The Structural Theory of Wisdom LicenseCC BY 4.0

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
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