Contractualism and Two Types of Non-Identity
Choices that affect how well off future people will be often also affect who they will be. This generates “the Non-Identity Problem”: the problem of explaining why it would be wrong to create someone whose life would be worth living, rather than a numerically non-identical person whose life would be better. A growing number of contractualists say that their theory solves this problem, and to great effect. Contractualism is uniquely positioned to demonstrate that the choice at issue would be wrong because it would wrong someone, and thus to deliver an attractive, non-consequentialist theory of intergenerational ethics. I argue this is a mistake. Contractualism can neither solve the Non-Identity Problem nor deliver the theory of intergenerational ethics promised. This conclusion proves consequential not only for contractualist moral theory, but for intergenerational ethics, generally.
Authors
- Owen Clifton
Institutions
- University of Regina (CA)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Published
- 2026-11-22
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-bja10195
- Primary Topic
- Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00