Consequence Made Present: A Filtration-Theoretic Account of Felt Consciousness and the Hard Problem
The hard problem of consciousness persists because objective descriptions of processing appear to leave out the fact that a condition is felt. This paper argues that the apparent remainder is produced by beginning the explanation too late and by treating experience as an addition to an already complete physical process. Filtration Theory instead reconstructs a graded natural sequence. Inanimate systems can exhibit differential constraint, integration, persistence, hysteresis, and in some cases residue. Living systems add bounded self-maintenance, making interactions consequential relative to the continuation of an organisation. Many non-neural organisms add distributed regulation, memory-like change, and adaptive trade-offs without thereby supplying good evidence of feeling. A further problem becomes acute in coherently acting animals: heterogeneous consequences must be made jointly significant for one continuing organism whose actual or counterfactual possibilities are mutually constraining. The proposed phenomenal boundary is reached when differentiated organism-relative consequences are recurrently integrated as one temporally extended, globally constraining, valenced possibility-condition that reorganises the system which will perform the next filtration. A felt condition is argued to be the intrinsic occurrence of that organisation, not a second property produced by it. The case is organised as five mutually constraining steps: continuity without over-attribution; consequence without phenomenality; consequence made jointly present; identification of the bearer as a materially continuous historical organisation; and causal and historical non-detachability. Perceptual quality is treated as the intrinsic occurrence of a differentiated sensory relation within a biologically organised, historically modified, and context-sensitive contrast-field, rather than as a phenomenal addition to otherwise complete discrimination. The account neither attributes experience to matter generally nor identifies consciousness with complexity, learning, mobility, report, or arbitration alone. It generates falsifiable comparative and interventionist predictions and identifies its principal unresolved burden: operationally distinguishing a unified consequence-condition from sophisticated unconscious control without defining consciousness into the criterion.
Authors
- Carl Samuel Warwick
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24428825
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Type
- preprint