Incel: From Niche Identity to Mainstreamed Journey

Who is the incel today? Once a niche identity linked with self-deprecating humour and the embracement of “loser” status in the early 4chan, 8chan, and Reddit spaces, the figure of the incel has gradually shifted. As the far right becomes the near-right (Feldman), the identity of an incel has expanded past its initial subcultural communities to creep into the mainstream. While “mainstream” is a complex term, we see it having an attitudinal component (Crulli and Albertazzi), where mainstream ideas become established in politics and societies—and a political economic component (Sponholz et al.) where a diverse range of societal actors across diverse domains normalise and justify far-right ideologies, activities, and attitudes. For us, the permeation of incel language into society (e.g. “mogging”), the widespread circulation of incel content (e.g. manfluencers) on major platforms, and the endorsement of incel-aligned ideas by key leaders (e.g. Trump) fulfill these mainstreaming criteria. “Incel” has transformed from a self-identified label to a broader term circulating across the manosphere—and incel ideologies have spread into broader formations of structural misogyny interwoven with the wider sociopolitical climate (Sugiura). This process of “normiefication” and normalisation (Solea and Sugiura) has thinned the original meaning, describing at once a subculture, a population of men perceived as socially or sexually inadequate, or a type of man with misogynist or conservative values of women. Indeed, the boundaries between incels, alpha males, and other manosphere identities have become so blurred that the description of identities has become interchangeable. Yet if these identities are blurry, all follow the same metanarrative of “becoming a real man”. So rather than precisely defining some ideal identity, or developing a check-list of compulsory qualities, we focus here instead on contemporary masculine identity as a form of journey. What are the key stages along this journey and how do they transform the individual over time? While every individual’s experience is certainly distinct, we are interested in the common milestones or core operations needed to begin, progress, and “end” this journey. To sketch this journey, we conduct a high-level synthesis of current scholarship on incels and the manosphere, observation of several online manosphere communities over two months, discourse analysis of a key manfluencer (Andrew Tate), and insights from our own extensive work on hate and radicalisation (Munn, “Alt Right Pipeline”; “More Than a Mob”; “Sustainable Hate”; Red Pilled; “Surface and Sublevel Hate”). Moving across this material, what emerged strongly was a kind of engine between technology and subjectivity—feedback loops operating between infrastructures and identity, the digital and the psychological. The journey of the incel is not just one of loneliness or alienation, it is also a story of how insecurity becomes weaponised and commercialised by platforms, algorithms, and influencers. Attending to this media ecosystem distinguishes our framework from others in political psychology, for example (Capelos et al.). Focussing on key transformations, we arrive at four phases. I. Entry via Alienation and the Algorithm The journey begins with a sense of inadequacy. The subject feels abandoned by the social world and relegated to the bottom rung of masculine hierarchy, one that is assumed to be natural and effortless for others. This alienation is not only the absence of intimacy but a conviction of their exclusion from any possibility of intimacy—a fatalistic and nihilistic belief linked to incel cultures and known as swallowing the black pill. Blackpillers believe they are involuntarily disengaged from society and condemned to live as socially dead individuals (Purhmann and Schlaerth). Key to the blackpilled vision is that inferiority is innate and unalterable—by losing the genetic lottery, these men will always be unfuckable and therefore subhuman (Bachaud). This is what distinguishes incel alienation from everyday insecurity: not merely that I am struggling but more fundamentally that there is no place for me in the world of men. As ex-radicals explain, this leads to searching for help online in the form of dating articles, YouTube tutorials, Reddit threads, and self-help podcasts (Munn). At first, the Internet acts as a buffer against shame. Others describe similar experiences, empathising with the incel (Beran). The recognition feels stabilising, helping them feel normal. But digital environments not only mirror emotion, they shape and intensify it. Therapeutic support for loneliness can rapidly twist into misogynistic blame and a war on women (Banet-Weiser and Bratich). Such ideas can be stated overtly but often operate more ambiently, as a gradual influence over time shaped by repetition, tone, humour, and shared affect (Author). In other words, it is less about the subject consciously adopting a worldview, and instead that worldview settling around them as an informational environment. This process often unfolds across multiple platforms such as Reddit, YouTube, TikTok, Discord, and 4chan, with links leading subjects effortlessly from one space to another. It may begin with a meme joking about being ignored by women, leading to a thread discussing “status”, on to a video about “female nature”, which then links to a longer podcast on “sexual hierarchies”. The algorithm responds to attention not belief. As Yin et al. describe, platform recommendation systems are driven by dwell time: the more one engages with content framed with emotions such as frustration, rejection, or resentment, the platform recommends more content with these emotions. The prime directive of platforms—engagement—means they excel at latching onto emotional vulnerability and delivering material that elevates and prolongs this affective state. Marwick and Lewis note that online radicalisation begins with the capture effect: moments when users feel uncertain, insecure, or unseen. Similarly, Banet-Weiser discusses an economy built on anxious attachment: the more a user feels wounded, the greater hold the platform exerts on him. It is not that the incel is searching for misogyny, resentment, or despair initially; rather, these emotions are scaled as high retention content. Thus the platform continues to deliver them, exploiting the subject’s vulnerability. While individuals take different pathways, the typical effect of this technical-ideological environment is to transform romantic rejection. Personal pain is transfigured into an inevitable outcome driven by structural injustice. Through the repeated exposure of memes, testimonies, blackpill commentary, and ironic self-loathing, the incel starts to see intimacy and masculinity as scarce commodities rather than fluid social practices. They come to believe that qualities such as sexual appeal, physical looks, and high incomes are unevenly distributed within a rigged economy. The narrative is simple but powerful: some men are always chosen, possessing high “sexual-market-value”, or desirability versus competitors, while others are permanently excluded (O’Malley et al.). In his online manifesto, the ur-incel Elliot Rodger explicitly talked about feelings of inferiority due to his body and lack of relationships, and his resentment at those who embodied success in these areas. Alienation moves from a surface emotion or passing phase to become lodged at a deeper level as a sense of identity. Incel is not just a label but a logic (Munn), a cohesive narrative that makes sense of the world and the subject’s place within it. II. Engaging with the Masculine Marketplace When the identity of the incel has crystallised and alienation has found this compelling explanation, a new figure appears: the “real man”. The real man offers a model of masculinity that appears tangible and achievable because he embodies it. The tokens of success are overt: bank accounts, luxury cars, beautiful models, and sweeping studio shots are the evidence of his ability to command wealth and women (Das). The real man is at once a product, an influencer, a motivational speaker, a dating strategist, and a fitness entrepreneur. This self-improvement catalyst is perhaps the key “innovation” of the new incel culture, departing from the blackpilled fatalism that marked earlier and more niche variants (though even then, testimonies about attempts at relating to women suggest fatalism was never total). At this point, what we term the “masculine marketplace” opens up. The promise is simple but powerful: change your body, change your mind, change your life. In this imaginary, all you need is a new wardrobe, gym routine, dietary supplement, vocal posture, dating script, or winning mindset to become a “real man”. The viral rise of looksmaxxing online, or maximising personal attractiveness, exemplifies these connections. Sculpting the body via fitness or plastic surgery becomes a pathway to romantic success and social mobility framed as ascension (Sousbois). Underneath this language of empowerment is a commercial structure built on insecurity. As Gill has argued, modern empowerment rhetoric works by making people responsible for fixing themselves instead of questioning the system that produces their pain. The manosphere adopts this concept perfectly: the incel is told that the wound is structural (a rigged sexual marketplace), but his solution is personal. The world is unfair, but a “real man” overcomes this through discipline, self-improvement, and consumption. For the alienated and insecure, the masculine marketplace offers clarity in place of confusion and direction during times of uncertainty (Munn). Tate offers a course; Peterson presents twelve steps; Cernovich defines a mindset. The “real man” always appears to be in total control. He speaks with absolute certainty and provides a clear set of next steps that explain to the ince

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Publication Details

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M/C Journal
Published
2026-11-21
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https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3269
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Populism, Right-Wing Movements
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article
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article

Incel: From Niche Identity to Mainstreamed Journey

Luke Munn, Kunchok Topgyal
M/C Journal
Populism, Right-Wing Movements
article

Incel: From Niche Identity to Mainstreamed Journey

Luke Munn, Kunchok Topgyal
article en

Abstract

Who is the incel today? Once a niche identity linked with self-deprecating humour and the embracement of “loser” status in the early 4chan, 8chan, and Reddit spaces, the figure of the incel has gradually shifted. As the far right becomes the near-right (Feldman), the identity of an incel has expanded past its initial subcultural communities to creep into the mainstream. While “mainstream” is a complex term, we see it having an attitudinal component (Crulli and Albertazzi), where mainstream ideas become established in politics and societies—and a political economic component (Sponholz et al.) where a diverse range of societal actors across diverse domains normalise and justify far-right ideologies, activities, and attitudes. For us, the permeation of incel language into society (e.g. “mogging”), the widespread circulation of incel content (e.g. manfluencers) on major platforms, and the endorsement of incel-aligned ideas by key leaders (e.g. Trump) fulfill these mainstreaming criteria. “Incel” has transformed from a self-identified label to a broader term circulating across the manosphere—and incel ideologies have spread into broader formations of structural misogyny interwoven with the wider sociopolitical climate (Sugiura). This process of “normiefication” and normalisation (Solea and Sugiura) has thinned the original meaning, describing at once a subculture, a population of men perceived as socially or sexually inadequate, or a type of man with misogynist or conservative values of women. Indeed, the boundaries between incels, alpha males, and other manosphere identities have become so blurred that the description of identities has become interchangeable. Yet if these identities are blurry, all follow the same metanarrative of “becoming a real man”. So rather than precisely defining some ideal identity, or developing a check-list of compulsory qualities, we focus here instead on contemporary masculine identity as a form of journey. What are the key stages along this journey and how do they transform the individual over time? While every individual’s experience is certainly distinct, we are interested in the common milestones or core operations needed to begin, progress, and “end” this journey. To sketch this journey, we conduct a high-level synthesis of current scholarship on incels and the manosphere, observation of several online manosphere communities over two months, discourse analysis of a key manfluencer (Andrew Tate), and insights from our own extensive work on hate and radicalisation (Munn, “Alt Right Pipeline”; “More Than a Mob”; “Sustainable Hate”; Red Pilled; “Surface and Sublevel Hate”). Moving across this material, what emerged strongly was a kind of engine between technology and subjectivity—feedback loops operating between infrastructures and identity, the digital and the psychological. The journey of the incel is not just one of loneliness or alienation, it is also a story of how insecurity becomes weaponised and commercialised by platforms, algorithms, and influencers. Attending to this media ecosystem distinguishes our framework from others in political psychology, for example (Capelos et al.). Focussing on key transformations, we arrive at four phases. I. Entry via Alienation and the Algorithm The journey begins with a sense of inadequacy. The subject feels abandoned by the social world and relegated to the bottom rung of masculine hierarchy, one that is assumed to be natural and effortless for others. This alienation is not only the absence of intimacy but a conviction of their exclusion from any possibility of intimacy—a fatalistic and nihilistic belief linked to incel cultures and known as swallowing the black pill. Blackpillers believe they are involuntarily disengaged from society and condemned to live as socially dead individuals (Purhmann and Schlaerth). Key to the blackpilled vision is that inferiority is innate and unalterable—by losing the genetic lottery, these men will always be unfuckable and therefore subhuman (Bachaud). This is what distinguishes incel alienation from everyday insecurity: not merely that I am struggling but more fundamentally that there is no place for me in the world of men. As ex-radicals explain, this leads to searching for help online in the form of dating articles, YouTube tutorials, Reddit threads, and self-help podcasts (Munn). At first, the Internet acts as a buffer against shame. Others describe similar experiences, empathising with the incel (Beran). The recognition feels stabilising, helping them feel normal. But digital environments not only mirror emotion, they shape and intensify it. Therapeutic support for loneliness can rapidly twist into misogynistic blame and a war on women (Banet-Weiser and Bratich). Such ideas can be stated overtly but often operate more ambiently, as a gradual influence over time shaped by repetition, tone, humour, and shared affect (Author). In other words, it is less about the subject consciously adopting a worldview, and instead that worldview settling around them as an informational environment. This process often unfolds across multiple platforms such as Reddit, YouTube, TikTok, Discord, and 4chan, with links leading subjects effortlessly from one space to another. It may begin with a meme joking about being ignored by women, leading to a thread discussing “status”, on to a video about “female nature”, which then links to a longer podcast on “sexual hierarchies”. The algorithm responds to attention not belief. As Yin et al. describe, platform recommendation systems are driven by dwell time: the more one engages with content framed with emotions such as frustration, rejection, or resentment, the platform recommends more content with these emotions. The prime directive of platforms—engagement—means they excel at latching onto emotional vulnerability and delivering material that elevates and prolongs this affective state. Marwick and Lewis note that online radicalisation begins with the capture effect: moments when users feel uncertain, insecure, or unseen. Similarly, Banet-Weiser discusses an economy built on anxious attachment: the more a user feels wounded, the greater hold the platform exerts on him. It is not that the incel is searching for misogyny, resentment, or despair initially; rather, these emotions are scaled as high retention content. Thus the platform continues to deliver them, exploiting the subject’s vulnerability. While individuals take different pathways, the typical effect of this technical-ideological environment is to transform romantic rejection. Personal pain is transfigured into an inevitable outcome driven by structural injustice. Through the repeated exposure of memes, testimonies, blackpill commentary, and ironic self-loathing, the incel starts to see intimacy and masculinity as scarce commodities rather than fluid social practices. They come to believe that qualities such as sexual appeal, physical looks, and high incomes are unevenly distributed within a rigged economy. The narrative is simple but powerful: some men are always chosen, possessing high “sexual-market-value”, or desirability versus competitors, while others are permanently excluded (O’Malley et al.). In his online manifesto, the ur-incel Elliot Rodger explicitly talked about feelings of inferiority due to his body and lack of relationships, and his resentment at those who embodied success in these areas. Alienation moves from a surface emotion or passing phase to become lodged at a deeper level as a sense of identity. Incel is not just a label but a logic (Munn), a cohesive narrative that makes sense of the world and the subject’s place within it. II. Engaging with the Masculine Marketplace When the identity of the incel has crystallised and alienation has found this compelling explanation, a new figure appears: the “real man”. The real man offers a model of masculinity that appears tangible and achievable because he embodies it. The tokens of success are overt: bank accounts, luxury cars, beautiful models, and sweeping studio shots are the evidence of his ability to command wealth and women (Das). The real man is at once a product, an influencer, a motivational speaker, a dating strategist, and a fitness entrepreneur. This self-improvement catalyst is perhaps the key “innovation” of the new incel culture, departing from the blackpilled fatalism that marked earlier and more niche variants (though even then, testimonies about attempts at relating to women suggest fatalism was never total). At this point, what we term the “masculine marketplace” opens up. The promise is simple but powerful: change your body, change your mind, change your life. In this imaginary, all you need is a new wardrobe, gym routine, dietary supplement, vocal posture, dating script, or winning mindset to become a “real man”. The viral rise of looksmaxxing online, or maximising personal attractiveness, exemplifies these connections. Sculpting the body via fitness or plastic surgery becomes a pathway to romantic success and social mobility framed as ascension (Sousbois). Underneath this language of empowerment is a commercial structure built on insecurity. As Gill has argued, modern empowerment rhetoric works by making people responsible for fixing themselves instead of questioning the system that produces their pain. The manosphere adopts this concept perfectly: the incel is told that the wound is structural (a rigged sexual marketplace), but his solution is personal. The world is unfair, but a “real man” overcomes this through discipline, self-improvement, and consumption. For the alienated and insecure, the masculine marketplace offers clarity in place of confusion and direction during times of uncertainty (Munn). Tate offers a course; Peterson presents twelve steps; Cernovich defines a mindset. The “real man” always appears to be in total control. He speaks with absolute certainty and provides a clear set of next steps that explain to the ince

M/C JournalVol. 29(6)
Populism, Right-Wing Movements
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