Who should govern public energy communities? The role of environmental awareness and privacy cost

Energy communities are becoming an important instrument of the clean energy transition, but their performance depends on how they are governed. We develop a model in which a municipality invests in renewable-energy infrastructure and chooses between public management and delegation to a private aggregator. Consumers differ in their willingness to pay, value self-produced energy, and incur privacy costs when consumption data are used beyond the operational baseline. Under the symmetric benchmark, private governance produces a smaller community because the aggregator applies a monopoly participation margin and does not internalize the benefit that additional members create for the rest of the community. Public governance therefore expands participation, while investment timing depends on how the operating surplus is allocated between the municipality, members, and the private operator. We then show that correcting the private participation distortion is only a partial alignment result: implementing the public-optimal community size does not by itself align member utility or investment timing. A regulated delegation contract can use a per-member inclusion payment to align participation, a membership-independent concession payment to align investment timing, and data-use restrictions to control privacy exposure. Finally, a numerical example relaxes operational symmetry by allowing the private operator to manage self-consumption more efficiently than the public operator. In this case, regulated delegation can combine public participation objectives with private operational efficiency when the relevant contractual margins are observable and enforceable.

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Publication Details

Journal
Energy Policy
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115727
Primary Topic
Energy Law and Policy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

Who should govern public energy communities? The role of environmental awareness and privacy cost

Dirk Bergemann, Marta Castellini, Marina Bertolini, Sergio Vergalli et al.
Energy Policy
Energy Law and Policy
article

Who should govern public energy communities? The role of environmental awareness and privacy cost

Dirk Bergemann, Marta Castellini, Marina Bertolini, Sergio Vergalli, Michele Moretto
article en

Abstract

Energy communities are becoming an important instrument of the clean energy transition, but their performance depends on how they are governed. We develop a model in which a municipality invests in renewable-energy infrastructure and chooses between public management and delegation to a private aggregator. Consumers differ in their willingness to pay, value self-produced energy, and incur privacy costs when consumption data are used beyond the operational baseline. Under the symmetric benchmark, private governance produces a smaller community because the aggregator applies a monopoly participation margin and does not internalize the benefit that additional members create for the rest of the community. Public governance therefore expands participation, while investment timing depends on how the operating surplus is allocated between the municipality, members, and the private operator. We then show that correcting the private participation distortion is only a partial alignment result: implementing the public-optimal community size does not by itself align member utility or investment timing. A regulated delegation contract can use a per-member inclusion payment to align participation, a membership-independent concession payment to align investment timing, and data-use restrictions to control privacy exposure. Finally, a numerical example relaxes operational symmetry by allowing the private operator to manage self-consumption more efficiently than the public operator. In this case, regulated delegation can combine public participation objectives with private operational efficiency when the relevant contractual margins are observable and enforceable.

Energy PolicyVol. 221
University of Padua (IT), Yale University (US), Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (IT), University of Brescia (IT)
Energy Law and Policy
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