The Universality of the Relative: On the Logical Self-Cancellation of Talk of the Absolute
This paper argues that relativity is a logical condition of cognition rather than a defect. A specific metaphysical structure—a concept stipulated to be an object belonging to no universe of discourse, “the Absolute”—cancels itself in its own operation. The argument relies solely on three defended semantic theses concerning definitional, quantificational, and negative operations: the Principle of Referential Internality; the Quantification Lemma (drawing a boundary does not require describing what lies beyond it, but any delimitation that claims a beyond asserts something about it); and the semantics of negation. The stipulative concept thus faces a dilemma: if it can be defined, it is internal; if it cannot, it is idle: a sign that has cancelled its own entitlement to truth-evaluability. The resulting contradiction is performative rather than formal. Kant’s Grenze/Schranke distinction anticipates the naive objection but founders on the semantics of negation; Wittgenstein’s “showing” preserves a residue; Carnap’s meta-criterion cannot vindicate itself. Against the relativist’s self-refutation paradox, the paper distinguishes object-level from condition-level assertions: “relativity is universal” is a condition-level assertion whose relativity lies in the context of reason-giving. The contribution is a third route (beyond Davidson and Habermas) on which the failure of absolute discourse displays itself at the point where inference breaks off. The verdict’s strength throughout is best-explanation rather than theorem.
Authors
- Wan-Jiu Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0001-6128-7610)
Publication Details
- Journal
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24411384
- Primary Topic
- Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00