The Charter Price of Commitment: Ex-Post Enforcement Failure, Delegation Mandates, and Break-Even Governance Maps
When a regulator cannot commit ex ante to penalty enforcement, sequential discretion fails symmetrically across welfare conventions. Once strategic monitoring attention is sunk, a discretionary tribunal abandons enforcement altogether under administrative write-down accounting, collapsing to universal bailout. Conversely, under recycled-fine transfer accounting, an unchecked tribunal ignores monitor distress past a revenue edge and pushes penalties upward to an interior or statutory hold-up ceiling, collapsing monitoring to zero effort. We prove universal strict concavity of monitor certainty-equivalent growth and characterize when delegation charters restore interior compliance. Under strictly positive retained revenue, either a conservative tribunal weight mandate or a revenue-retention cap implements an engaged interior equilibrium within thin adjudication-cost tolerances. Under self-financing write-down accounting, interior delegation is impossible, forcing a binary choice between hard statutory commitment and an externally funded escrow enforcement bounty. Decomposing charter break-even budgets exposes regimes where partial charge-setter commitment underperforms discretionary anarchy, an open partial-identification band where Minimax Regret and level Maximin Welfare prescribe opposite institutions (robust on destructible seats, while reversing on insulated seats above high statutory ceilings), opposite preference-curvature effects across monitor seats, and ceiling-sensitive leakage and risk-premium qualifications.
Authors
- Mikio Hanaeda (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-1370-4468)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24386305
- Primary Topic
- Regulation and Compliance Studies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00