Governance of Unsafe Behavior in Electric Power Maintenance: A Three-Population Evolutionary Game with Endogenous Risk and a Conserved Quantity

Maintenance crews work inside short windows on de-energized equipment, and the casualties that follow are few, severe and almost always preceded by a departure from a written procedure. Three agents decide whether that departure happens: the crew, the supervisor and the utility that pays for supervision. We model the layers as a three-population evolutionary game in which accident probability is endogenous and super-linear, penalties are proportional to fault, and the supervisor has a reason to look away. A vertex criterion classifies the eight pure-strategy states, and a Latin hypercube design with partial rank correlation ranks the parameters. Three closed-form thresholds split the risk sensitivity into four regimes, with no stable pure strategy between the last two; there the flow preserves volume in logit coordinates, the compliance face admits an explicit first integral, and the equilibrium is a nonlinear center of computable period. Costlier regulation destroys the center and makes two delegated-governance states bistable. The levers are the effort a shortcut saves, regulation cost, accountability and schedule pressure, not the penalties.

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11616764/v1
Primary Topic
Occupational Health and Safety Research
Type
preprint

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preprint

Governance of Unsafe Behavior in Electric Power Maintenance: A Three-Population Evolutionary Game with Endogenous Risk and a Conserved Quantity

Kaikai Man, Xue Yang
1 links
Research Square
Occupational Health and Safety Research
preprint

Governance of Unsafe Behavior in Electric Power Maintenance: A Three-Population Evolutionary Game with Endogenous Risk and a Conserved Quantity

Kaikai Man, Xue Yang
preprint en

Abstract

Maintenance crews work inside short windows on de-energized equipment, and the casualties that follow are few, severe and almost always preceded by a departure from a written procedure. Three agents decide whether that departure happens: the crew, the supervisor and the utility that pays for supervision. We model the layers as a three-population evolutionary game in which accident probability is endogenous and super-linear, penalties are proportional to fault, and the supervisor has a reason to look away. A vertex criterion classifies the eight pure-strategy states, and a Latin hypercube design with partial rank correlation ranks the parameters. Three closed-form thresholds split the risk sensitivity into four regimes, with no stable pure strategy between the last two; there the flow preserves volume in logit coordinates, the compliance face admits an explicit first integral, and the equilibrium is a nonlinear center of computable period. Costlier regulation destroys the center and makes two delegated-governance states bistable. The levers are the effort a shortcut saves, regulation cost, accountability and schedule pressure, not the penalties.

Research Square
North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power (CN)
National Natural Science Foundation of China
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Occupational Health and Safety Research
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Governance of Unsafe Behavior in Electric Power Maintenance: A Three-Population Evolutionary Game with Endogenous Risk and a Conserved Quantity — Kaikai Man, Xue Yang · Research Square (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS