Governance of Unsafe Behavior in Electric Power Maintenance: A Three-Population Evolutionary Game with Endogenous Risk and a Conserved Quantity
Maintenance crews work inside short windows on de-energized equipment, and the casualties that follow are few, severe and almost always preceded by a departure from a written procedure. Three agents decide whether that departure happens: the crew, the supervisor and the utility that pays for supervision. We model the layers as a three-population evolutionary game in which accident probability is endogenous and super-linear, penalties are proportional to fault, and the supervisor has a reason to look away. A vertex criterion classifies the eight pure-strategy states, and a Latin hypercube design with partial rank correlation ranks the parameters. Three closed-form thresholds split the risk sensitivity into four regimes, with no stable pure strategy between the last two; there the flow preserves volume in logit coordinates, the compliance face admits an explicit first integral, and the equilibrium is a nonlinear center of computable period. Costlier regulation destroys the center and makes two delegated-governance states bistable. The levers are the effort a shortcut saves, regulation cost, accountability and schedule pressure, not the penalties.
Authors
- Kaikai Man
- Xue Yang
Institutions
- North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power (CN)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-11-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11616764/v1
- Primary Topic
- Occupational Health and Safety Research
- Type
- preprint
Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China