Usage policies negotiation in data trading with time-discounting valuations: a multi-stage Stackelberg game approach

Usage policies in data trading play a critical role in regulating stakeholders’ access to and use of data, serving as a fundamental mechanism for preventing data misuse. Stakeholders often have different preferences regarding the strictness of these policies, particularly in time-sensitive data trading where the value of data product decays over time. Consequently, stakeholders must negotiate to establish appropriate data usage policies. However, existing negotiation approaches generally fail to consider the dual impact of policy strictness on both the risk of data misuse and the value of data, making it difficult to balance the interests of all stakeholders. To address this challenge, we propose a Stackelberg game-based pricing mechanism that incentivizes stakeholders to negotiate and agree on an optimal data usage policy. Using backward induction, we derive each participant’s optimal response and the resulting equilibrium under the given sequential decision structure. We further develop a pricing algorithm to determine the service consumer’s optimal payment. Experimental results show that our mechanism improves stakeholder utilities and delivery timeliness compared with baseline mechanisms under the unified evaluation setting.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Computer Journal
Published
2026-11-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1093/comjnl/bxag123
Primary Topic
Access Control and Trust
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Usage policies negotiation in data trading with time-discounting valuations: a multi-stage Stackelberg game approach

Mingjie Yu, Lingcui Zhang, Fenghua Li, Yunchuan Guo et al.
4 links
The Computer Journal
Access Control and Trust
article

Usage policies negotiation in data trading with time-discounting valuations: a multi-stage Stackelberg game approach

Mingjie Yu, Lingcui Zhang, Fenghua Li, Yunchuan Guo, Xinyi Shi, Liang Fang
article en

Abstract

Usage policies in data trading play a critical role in regulating stakeholders’ access to and use of data, serving as a fundamental mechanism for preventing data misuse. Stakeholders often have different preferences regarding the strictness of these policies, particularly in time-sensitive data trading where the value of data product decays over time. Consequently, stakeholders must negotiate to establish appropriate data usage policies. However, existing negotiation approaches generally fail to consider the dual impact of policy strictness on both the risk of data misuse and the value of data, making it difficult to balance the interests of all stakeholders. To address this challenge, we propose a Stackelberg game-based pricing mechanism that incentivizes stakeholders to negotiate and agree on an optimal data usage policy. Using backward induction, we derive each participant’s optimal response and the resulting equilibrium under the given sequential decision structure. We further develop a pricing algorithm to determine the service consumer’s optimal payment. Experimental results show that our mechanism improves stakeholder utilities and delivery timeliness compared with baseline mechanisms under the unified evaluation setting.

The Computer Journal
University of Science and Technology of China (CN), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN), Institute of Information Engineering (CN), University of Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN)
National Key Research and Development Program of China
Access Control and Trust
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Usage policies negotiation in data trading with time-discounting valuations: a multi-stage Stackelberg game approach — Mingjie Yu, Lingcui Zhang, et al. · The Computer Journal (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS