Perspectivism and the Possibility of De Re Response to Normative Reasons

Perspectivism about ought-statements, or claims about decisive normative reasons, imposes an epistemic constraint on the decisive reasons an agent can have for acting. This paper explores how the distinction between de re and de dicto responses to normative reasons bears on the normative debates over perspectivism about decisive reasons. It begins by clarifying the distinction between two interpretations of perspectivism. According to de re perspectivism, a fact can provide an agent with a decisive reason to act only if the agent has sufficient evidence that that fact obtains. By contrast, de dicto perspectivism holds that an agent can have a decisive reason to act only if she has sufficient evidence to believe that she has a decisive reason to act. The paper then advances two main claims. First, it argues that the metaphysical possibility of de re response to normative reasons provides strong evidence against de dicto perspectivism. If an agent can respond to her decisive normative reasons without deliberating about whether she has those reasons, then there can be cases in which she has decisive reasons to act in a certain way but lacks sufficient evidence to believe that she has such decisive reasons. Second, it responds to a parallel argument for de dicto perspectivism advanced by Kiesewetter (2016). Kiesewetter argues that the metaphysical possibility of de dicto response to normative reasons is incompatible with rejecting de dicto perspectivism. I show that the argument relies on an implausibly synchronic notion of responding to normative reasons. In particular, it overlooks the fact that responding de dicto to a normative reason is a mental process that unfolds over time. This diachronic dimension of responding to normative reasons explains why the possibility of de dicto response to reasons is compatible with rejecting de dicto perspectivism.

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11583622/v1
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
preprint
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Perspectivism and the Possibility of De Re Response to Normative Reasons

Mohamad Hadi Safaei
2 links
Research Square
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
preprint

Perspectivism and the Possibility of De Re Response to Normative Reasons

Mohamad Hadi Safaei
preprint en

Abstract

Perspectivism about ought-statements, or claims about decisive normative reasons, imposes an epistemic constraint on the decisive reasons an agent can have for acting. This paper explores how the distinction between de re and de dicto responses to normative reasons bears on the normative debates over perspectivism about decisive reasons. It begins by clarifying the distinction between two interpretations of perspectivism. According to de re perspectivism, a fact can provide an agent with a decisive reason to act only if the agent has sufficient evidence that that fact obtains. By contrast, de dicto perspectivism holds that an agent can have a decisive reason to act only if she has sufficient evidence to believe that she has a decisive reason to act. The paper then advances two main claims. First, it argues that the metaphysical possibility of de re response to normative reasons provides strong evidence against de dicto perspectivism. If an agent can respond to her decisive normative reasons without deliberating about whether she has those reasons, then there can be cases in which she has decisive reasons to act in a certain way but lacks sufficient evidence to believe that she has such decisive reasons. Second, it responds to a parallel argument for de dicto perspectivism advanced by Kiesewetter (2016). Kiesewetter argues that the metaphysical possibility of de dicto response to normative reasons is incompatible with rejecting de dicto perspectivism. I show that the argument relies on an implausibly synchronic notion of responding to normative reasons. In particular, it overlooks the fact that responding de dicto to a normative reason is a mental process that unfolds over time. This diachronic dimension of responding to normative reasons explains why the possibility of de dicto response to reasons is compatible with rejecting de dicto perspectivism.

Research Square
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IR)
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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