City representation in Washington: determinants and responses

When and why do cities lobby the federal government? Although intergovernmental lobbying has grown, variation in municipal lobbying remains insufficiently understood. We link city lobbying to congressional representation, arguing that poorly aligned cities hire lobbyists to compensate for representational shortfalls and that municipal competition can encourage lobbying when other local governments press competing claims. Using city-level data from 2008 to 2018, we find strong support for the alignment expectation and evidence that competition matters conditionally on a city’s position within the district, but little evidence that competition moderates the effect of city–members of Congress alignment. The results recast intergovernmental lobbying as both a substitute for weak ex ante representation and a strategy through which cities seek influence in shared congressional constituencies.

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Publication Details

Journal
Political Science Research and Methods
Published
2026-11-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2026.10148
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

City representation in Washington: determinants and responses

Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Fred Gui
Political Science Research and Methods
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
article

City representation in Washington: determinants and responses

Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Fred Gui
article en

Abstract

When and why do cities lobby the federal government? Although intergovernmental lobbying has grown, variation in municipal lobbying remains insufficiently understood. We link city lobbying to congressional representation, arguing that poorly aligned cities hire lobbyists to compensate for representational shortfalls and that municipal competition can encourage lobbying when other local governments press competing claims. Using city-level data from 2008 to 2018, we find strong support for the alignment expectation and evidence that competition matters conditionally on a city’s position within the district, but little evidence that competition moderates the effect of city–members of Congress alignment. The results recast intergovernmental lobbying as both a substitute for weak ex ante representation and a strategy through which cities seek influence in shared congressional constituencies.

Political Science Research and Methods
Louisiana State University (US), University of Rochester (US)
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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City representation in Washington: determinants and responses — Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Fred Gui · Political Science Research and Methods (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS