City representation in Washington: determinants and responses
When and why do cities lobby the federal government? Although intergovernmental lobbying has grown, variation in municipal lobbying remains insufficiently understood. We link city lobbying to congressional representation, arguing that poorly aligned cities hire lobbyists to compensate for representational shortfalls and that municipal competition can encourage lobbying when other local governments press competing claims. Using city-level data from 2008 to 2018, we find strong support for the alignment expectation and evidence that competition matters conditionally on a city’s position within the district, but little evidence that competition moderates the effect of city–members of Congress alignment. The results recast intergovernmental lobbying as both a substitute for weak ex ante representation and a strategy through which cities seek influence in shared congressional constituencies.
Authors
- Lawrence S. Rothenberg (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2788-5585)
- Fred Gui (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3716-6974)
Institutions
- Louisiana State University (US)
- University of Rochester (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Political Science Research and Methods
- Published
- 2026-11-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2026.10148
- Primary Topic
- Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00