Privatising under dominance: bid preferences in telecommunications auctions with downstream competition

When a government sells a telecommunications asset to bidders that compete downstream, an incumbent's willingness to pay includes the value of denying the asset to its rivals. We embed a dominant-strategy ascending auction in a capacity-constrained Cournot market and show that the dominant firm's valuation is pure preemption, exceeds that of a challenger, and leads to an allocation that raises concentration and lowers consumer surplus. We derive the welfare-weighted Myerson mechanism for general valuation distributions, prove that a multiplicative bid preference is incentive compatible and discriminates in the optimal direction, and obtain closed forms for the uniform case, in which a preference recovers exactly three quarters of the optimal revenue gain. Calibrated to official data for the Colombian mobile market, a Monte Carlo study of 10,000 auctions shows that, with a cost of public funds of 0.3, the optimal preference lowers the incumbent's winning probability from 82% to 17%, costs the State US$93 million in expected proceeds, raises consumer surplus by US$589 million, and attains 96% of the Myerson welfare gain; barring the incumbent is dominated. A revenue-maximising State would still favour the challenger, with a milder preference (β∗ = 0.77).

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Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11556888/v1
Primary Topic
Auction Theory and Applications
Type
preprint
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preprint

Privatising under dominance: bid preferences in telecommunications auctions with downstream competition

Hernando Hernández-Lasso
Research Square
Auction Theory and Applications
preprint

Privatising under dominance: bid preferences in telecommunications auctions with downstream competition

Hernando Hernández-Lasso
preprint en

Abstract

When a government sells a telecommunications asset to bidders that compete downstream, an incumbent's willingness to pay includes the value of denying the asset to its rivals. We embed a dominant-strategy ascending auction in a capacity-constrained Cournot market and show that the dominant firm's valuation is pure preemption, exceeds that of a challenger, and leads to an allocation that raises concentration and lowers consumer surplus. We derive the welfare-weighted Myerson mechanism for general valuation distributions, prove that a multiplicative bid preference is incentive compatible and discriminates in the optimal direction, and obtain closed forms for the uniform case, in which a preference recovers exactly three quarters of the optimal revenue gain. Calibrated to official data for the Colombian mobile market, a Monte Carlo study of 10,000 auctions shows that, with a cost of public funds of 0.3, the optimal preference lowers the incumbent's winning probability from 82% to 17%, costs the State US$93 million in expected proceeds, raises consumer surplus by US$589 million, and attains 96% of the Myerson welfare gain; barring the incumbent is dominated. A revenue-maximising State would still favour the challenger, with a milder preference (β∗ = 0.77).

Research Square
University of Agder (NO)
Auction Theory and Applications
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Privatising under dominance: bid preferences in telecommunications auctions with downstream competition — Hernando Hernández-Lasso · Research Square (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS