Privatising under dominance: bid preferences in telecommunications auctions with downstream competition
When a government sells a telecommunications asset to bidders that compete downstream, an incumbent's willingness to pay includes the value of denying the asset to its rivals. We embed a dominant-strategy ascending auction in a capacity-constrained Cournot market and show that the dominant firm's valuation is pure preemption, exceeds that of a challenger, and leads to an allocation that raises concentration and lowers consumer surplus. We derive the welfare-weighted Myerson mechanism for general valuation distributions, prove that a multiplicative bid preference is incentive compatible and discriminates in the optimal direction, and obtain closed forms for the uniform case, in which a preference recovers exactly three quarters of the optimal revenue gain. Calibrated to official data for the Colombian mobile market, a Monte Carlo study of 10,000 auctions shows that, with a cost of public funds of 0.3, the optimal preference lowers the incumbent's winning probability from 82% to 17%, costs the State US$93 million in expected proceeds, raises consumer surplus by US$589 million, and attains 96% of the Myerson welfare gain; barring the incumbent is dominated. A revenue-maximising State would still favour the challenger, with a milder preference (β∗ = 0.77).
Authors
- Hernando Hernández-Lasso
Institutions
- University of Agder (NO)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Research Square
- Published
- 2026-11-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11556888/v1
- Primary Topic
- Auction Theory and Applications
- Type
- preprint