Proxy Optimization and Purpose Displacement: Why Paying for the Count Can Change What Is Counted
This conceptual paper introduces Proxy Optimization and Purpose Displacement, a mechanism in the Representation and Measurement series of On Human Modeling. When a reward depends on a measure, people have a reason to change how they produce the count. Some ways of raising it advance the purpose it was chosen to indicate. Others earn the same reward while leaving that purpose unserved. The paper asks what conduct raised the count and what independent evidence shows whether the intended result followed. In a rat-control campaign that began in 1902, Hanoi’s colonial authorities offered one cent for every rat tail brought to the municipal offices. A tail was easier to handle than a carcass and was accepted as evidence of a kill. When live rats appeared in the city without their tails, observers had evidence that a hunter could collect the bounty and leave the rat alive. The campaign’s overall effect on the rat population remains open. Wells Fargo tied incentive pay to sales targets for additional products sold to existing customers. In a review covering May 2011 to July 2015, the bank estimated that employees may have opened about 1.5 million deposit accounts and submitted about 565,000 credit card applications without customer authorization. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau linked the practices to sales targets and bonuses. An account opening could count toward an employee’s target even when the customer had never requested the account. The paper places the mechanism within Donald Campbell’s account of how the use of indicators in social decisions can distort the activity they measure. A similar question arises if a team earns a bonus for increasing the share of an AI assistant’s answers that include a citation. Adding a citation to an unsupported answer raises the score. Reading the cited source to see whether it supports the answer tests the purpose for which the citation was requested.
Authors
- Alexandra Cary
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24408931
- Primary Topic
- Accounting and Organizational Management
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00