An explanationist analysis of causation
The goal of this paper is to offer an analysis of causation in terms of explanation. The basis of the analysis is a plausible principle about “cause-tracing explanations”, i.e. explanations that cite causes: c causes e if and only if the fact that c causes e explains the fact that c explains e. I use this principle to develop an analysis of causation in terms of the role it plays in explanation. I then offer three arguments for my “explanationist” analysis: it scores well on the desideratum of parsimony; it answers the question of what distinguishes grounding from causation; and finally, it offers a compelling synthesis of two seemingly incompatible pictures of explanation and explanatory relations.
Authors
- David Mark Kovacs (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9890-8089)
Institutions
- Tel Aviv University (IL)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2026-11-21
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02663-2
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- University of Bristol
- Israel Science Foundation
- Tel Aviv University