Conversing without asserting: chatbots as interlocutors

We argue that contemporary chatbots participate in conversations without making assertions, but instead by performing proto-assertoric acts (in a sense to be explicated) that are sensitive to the evolving needs of interlocutors, and in ways that help a conversation achieve its goal. In support of this claim we distinguish among different proto-assertoric stages including what we call ursertions and semisertions. These are utterances that can be evaluated for correctness while falling short of the epistemic and normative commitments characteristic of assertion. When appropriately sensitive to a shared conversational task, such utterances can nevertheless advance that task. We deploy this framework by treating conversations as goal-directed enterprises aimed at resolving practical or theoretical questions, within which such proto-assertoric interventions can play a substantive role. This account explains in a principled way how chatbots can participate in conversations without thereby attributing to them sensitivity to the distinctive normative commitments associated with assertion.

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Publication Details

Journal
Philosophical Studies
Published
2026-11-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02627-6
Primary Topic
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Conversing without asserting: chatbots as interlocutors

Jan G. Michel, Mitchell Green
2 links
Philosophical Studies
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
article

Conversing without asserting: chatbots as interlocutors

Jan G. Michel, Mitchell Green
article en

Abstract

We argue that contemporary chatbots participate in conversations without making assertions, but instead by performing proto-assertoric acts (in a sense to be explicated) that are sensitive to the evolving needs of interlocutors, and in ways that help a conversation achieve its goal. In support of this claim we distinguish among different proto-assertoric stages including what we call ursertions and semisertions. These are utterances that can be evaluated for correctness while falling short of the epistemic and normative commitments characteristic of assertion. When appropriately sensitive to a shared conversational task, such utterances can nevertheless advance that task. We deploy this framework by treating conversations as goal-directed enterprises aimed at resolving practical or theoretical questions, within which such proto-assertoric interventions can play a substantive role. This account explains in a principled way how chatbots can participate in conversations without thereby attributing to them sensitivity to the distinctive normative commitments associated with assertion.

Philosophical Studies
University of Connecticut (US), Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (DE)
University of Connecticut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
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