The CEO Overhang Effect

We document that CEOs reduce investment, increase net leverage, and expand net share repurchases over their tenure. To explain these patterns, we develop a dynamic model of a firm run by a sequence of CEOs. Each CEO has a finite tenure and chooses investment, financing, and payout to maximize her utility over wealth under a contract that combines a base salary with equity-based pay. The model identifies a new mechanism, the CEO overhang effect, which arises because the CEO's horizon is truncated and future CEOs are also granted equity. As a result, over her tenure a growing share of the returns to the firm's capital and of its costs of debt shifts from current shareholders, including the CEO, to future CEOs. The incumbent CEO therefore underinvests and levers up. She also increasingly repurchases shares, because a larger stake becomes more valuable to her as turnover approaches. Calibrating the model, we infer that the resulting agency cost amounts to 6% of shareholder value.

Authors

Publication Details

Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1172-2026
Primary Topic
Corporate Finance and Governance
Type
preprint
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preprint

The CEO Overhang Effect

Maria Cecilia Bustamante, Jakub Hajda, Boris Nikolov
Corporate Finance and Governance
preprint

The CEO Overhang Effect

Maria Cecilia Bustamante, Jakub Hajda, Boris Nikolov
preprint en

Abstract

We document that CEOs reduce investment, increase net leverage, and expand net share repurchases over their tenure. To explain these patterns, we develop a dynamic model of a firm run by a sequence of CEOs. Each CEO has a finite tenure and chooses investment, financing, and payout to maximize her utility over wealth under a contract that combines a base salary with equity-based pay. The model identifies a new mechanism, the CEO overhang effect, which arises because the CEO's horizon is truncated and future CEOs are also granted equity. As a result, over her tenure a growing share of the returns to the firm's capital and of its costs of debt shifts from current shareholders, including the CEO, to future CEOs. The incumbent CEO therefore underinvests and levers up. She also increasingly repurchases shares, because a larger stake becomes more valuable to her as turnover approaches. Calibrating the model, we infer that the resulting agency cost amounts to 6% of shareholder value.

Corporate Finance and Governance
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