Comparing subsidy allocation rules for battery electric heavy goods vehicles in great britain

This paper compares subsidy allocation mechanisms for battery electric heavy goods vehicles above 12 t in Great Britain using a controlled stochastic framework calibrated or constrained to selected observable 2025 Great Britain margins and policy rules applicable on 1 April 2026. One no-subsidy counterfactual and six active mechanisms are evaluated on matched annual opportunities across funded purchases, model-based additionality, operational well-to-wheel emissions avoided, public cost effectiveness, small-fleet inclusion and grant concentration. No allocation rule dominates across the evaluated criteria. Mechanism effects emerge only when a fundable margin exists. In the main active comparison, the depot infrastructure co-grant reaches more purchases than minimum-required subsidy, partly through greater permissible support headroom. Where qualifying opportunities satisfy the common infrastructure condition, minimum-required subsidy can deliver substantially lower public cost per gross additional operational well-to-wheel tonne avoided. The findings identify a conditional trade-off between reach and subsidy efficiency rather than a universal ranking.

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Publication Details

Journal
Transportation Research Part D Transport and Environment
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2026.105752
Primary Topic
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Comparing subsidy allocation rules for battery electric heavy goods vehicles in great britain

Efstathios-Al. Tingas
Transportation Research Part D Transport and Environment
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
article

Comparing subsidy allocation rules for battery electric heavy goods vehicles in great britain

Efstathios-Al. Tingas
article en

Abstract

This paper compares subsidy allocation mechanisms for battery electric heavy goods vehicles above 12 t in Great Britain using a controlled stochastic framework calibrated or constrained to selected observable 2025 Great Britain margins and policy rules applicable on 1 April 2026. One no-subsidy counterfactual and six active mechanisms are evaluated on matched annual opportunities across funded purchases, model-based additionality, operational well-to-wheel emissions avoided, public cost effectiveness, small-fleet inclusion and grant concentration. No allocation rule dominates across the evaluated criteria. Mechanism effects emerge only when a fundable margin exists. In the main active comparison, the depot infrastructure co-grant reaches more purchases than minimum-required subsidy, partly through greater permissible support headroom. Where qualifying opportunities satisfy the common infrastructure condition, minimum-required subsidy can deliver substantially lower public cost per gross additional operational well-to-wheel tonne avoided. The findings identify a conditional trade-off between reach and subsidy efficiency rather than a universal ranking.

Transportation Research Part D Transport and EnvironmentVol. 163
Edinburgh Napier University (GB)
Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure
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