Present but Not Protecting: A Controlled, Reproducible Study of When Linux Exploit Mitigations Actually Enforce
This paper investigates the gap between declared Linux exploit mitigations and their actual runtime enforcement. Thirteen controlled experiments examine memory-corruption defenses, with a focus on Intel CET shadow-stack activation, _FORTIFY_SOURCE coverage, and stack-protector instrumentation across shared-library boundaries. The study provides reproducible evidence showing why the presence of hardening features does not necessarily guarantee protection of a specific operation. Companion research artifact: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24382067
Authors
- Deniz Altunkapan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-0646-2889)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-11-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24382446
- Primary Topic
- Security and Verification in Computing
- Type
- preprint