Reason-Giving or Rationalisation? A Conceptual Review from the Perspective of Ignorance Studies

The behaviour that people call justification, self-deception, denial or deliberate ignorance has emerged from separate lines of research, and how these names relate to one another is unclear. As a result, one behaviour sometimes goes by several names, and different behaviours sometimes share one name. This article is a conceptual review. It draws on examples from tales and proverbs, anthropology, experimental psychology and law, and sets out twelve situations in which reason-giving relates to ignorance, from a reason that arrives after the act to a not-knowing that is put on show. To tell these situations apart, the article proposes five questions and a table: what the reason does, whom it is for, what happened to the information, what the person is aware of, and when the reason came. The article concludes that the choice between ‘reason-giving’ and ‘rationalisation’ is a false one. We can read the function of a reason from its behaviour, not from its content. Ignorance, too, is not always a deficit, and sometimes it is a tool. The article offers two labelled hypotheses: one about the inner audience of a reason, and one about a cheap test that separates a reason that serves understanding from a reason that serves defence. What it says concerns patterns. It passes no judgement on the intention or awareness of any particular person or event.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24367353
Primary Topic
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Type
preprint
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preprint

Reason-Giving or Rationalisation? A Conceptual Review from the Perspective of Ignorance Studies

Ramin Saadat
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
preprint

Reason-Giving or Rationalisation? A Conceptual Review from the Perspective of Ignorance Studies

Ramin Saadat
preprint en

Abstract

The behaviour that people call justification, self-deception, denial or deliberate ignorance has emerged from separate lines of research, and how these names relate to one another is unclear. As a result, one behaviour sometimes goes by several names, and different behaviours sometimes share one name. This article is a conceptual review. It draws on examples from tales and proverbs, anthropology, experimental psychology and law, and sets out twelve situations in which reason-giving relates to ignorance, from a reason that arrives after the act to a not-knowing that is put on show. To tell these situations apart, the article proposes five questions and a table: what the reason does, whom it is for, what happened to the information, what the person is aware of, and when the reason came. The article concludes that the choice between ‘reason-giving’ and ‘rationalisation’ is a false one. We can read the function of a reason from its behaviour, not from its content. Ignorance, too, is not always a deficit, and sometimes it is a tool. The article offers two labelled hypotheses: one about the inner audience of a reason, and one about a cheap test that separates a reason that serves understanding from a reason that serves defence. What it says concerns patterns. It passes no judgement on the intention or awareness of any particular person or event.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
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