Billionaire and Institutional Donor Concentration in the 2026 US Midterms: A Top-20 Contribution Share and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index Analysis of Families, Corporations, Organised Interests and Lobbyists through the Lens of Eight Economic Classes

Purpose This paper measures how concentrated large political money was in the 2026 US midterm elections, covering billionaire families and institutional donors (corporations, trade associations, single-issue organisations such as AIPAC and the gun lobby, party-aligned nonprofits and federal lobbyists), and interprets the results through an eight-class model of political economy in which the instrument of political voice changes with economic class. Design/methodology Using the Americans for Tax Fairness (ATF) Action Fund family-level compilation of Federal Election Commission (FEC) data (172 billionaire families, US$1.716 billion, 1 January 2025–28 August 2026), the New York Times top-20 donor ranking (US$1.945 billion to mid-October 2026) Public Citizen's corporate-donor data (US$737.3 million to 23 October 2026), reported spending by organised interests, and 2025 federal lobbying filings (about US$5.08 billion), the paper computes k-family concentration ratios, Herfindahl–Hirschman indices (HHI) with bounds for unobserved donors, Gini and Theil indices, Gabaix–Ibragimov tail exponents, wealth-elasticity regressions and Monte Carlo and bootstrap robustness checks. Findings The top 20 families supplied 63.1% of billionaire money and the top 10 supplied 44.6%, yet the within-elite HHI is only 261–261, which is "unconcentrated" by antitrust standards. Concentration therefore operates mainly between classes, not within the wealth-dominant class: 172 families, about one household in 784,000, account for roughly 14.4% of projected total federal spending. Direction is far more concentrated than source: the partisan-bloc HHI is 5,630, and 83% of the money flowed through committees with no contribution limits. Under late-cycle figures the top-20 share rises to 72.9% and HHI to 596. Despite a roughly 69:29 Republican tilt, Democrats won both chambers. Corporate money is more concentrated than family money (HHI 370–388), and crypto, online-betting and AI firms supplied 53% of it. When non-family corporations join the families, five firms enter the top 20 and CR 20 is 51.8%. Organised-interest domains such as crypto, betting and Israel policy are one-sided (domain HHI ≈ 10,000), and the NRA has shrunk by four-fifths since 2016. Automakers, defence contractors and drug companies work mainly through lobbying, which is the least concentrated channel by organisation (HHI < 30) but the most concentrated by class of interest: 48 of the top 50 lobbying spenders are businesses. Attributing corporate money by equity ownership, about 87% of identified large money traces to the top 1% of households. Originality/value The paper separates intra-class from inter-class concentration, distinguishes funders from intermediaries and electoral money from lobbying, proposes a class-indexed reading of HHI for political finance and sets out a monitoring and reform agenda. JEL Classification D72 · D31 · D63 · P16 · H11 · L11

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Research Square
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-11775168/v1
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
preprint

Billionaire and Institutional Donor Concentration in the 2026 US Midterms: A Top-20 Contribution Share and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index Analysis of Families, Corporations, Organised Interests and Lobbyists through the Lens of Eight Economic Classes

Muhmmad Muqeem Islam Muqeem
Research Square
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
preprint

Billionaire and Institutional Donor Concentration in the 2026 US Midterms: A Top-20 Contribution Share and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index Analysis of Families, Corporations, Organised Interests and Lobbyists through the Lens of Eight Economic Classes

Muhmmad Muqeem Islam Muqeem
preprint en

Abstract

Purpose This paper measures how concentrated large political money was in the 2026 US midterm elections, covering billionaire families and institutional donors (corporations, trade associations, single-issue organisations such as AIPAC and the gun lobby, party-aligned nonprofits and federal lobbyists), and interprets the results through an eight-class model of political economy in which the instrument of political voice changes with economic class. Design/methodology Using the Americans for Tax Fairness (ATF) Action Fund family-level compilation of Federal Election Commission (FEC) data (172 billionaire families, US$1.716 billion, 1 January 2025–28 August 2026), the New York Times top-20 donor ranking (US$1.945 billion to mid-October 2026) Public Citizen's corporate-donor data (US$737.3 million to 23 October 2026), reported spending by organised interests, and 2025 federal lobbying filings (about US$5.08 billion), the paper computes k-family concentration ratios, Herfindahl–Hirschman indices (HHI) with bounds for unobserved donors, Gini and Theil indices, Gabaix–Ibragimov tail exponents, wealth-elasticity regressions and Monte Carlo and bootstrap robustness checks. Findings The top 20 families supplied 63.1% of billionaire money and the top 10 supplied 44.6%, yet the within-elite HHI is only 261–261, which is "unconcentrated" by antitrust standards. Concentration therefore operates mainly between classes, not within the wealth-dominant class: 172 families, about one household in 784,000, account for roughly 14.4% of projected total federal spending. Direction is far more concentrated than source: the partisan-bloc HHI is 5,630, and 83% of the money flowed through committees with no contribution limits. Under late-cycle figures the top-20 share rises to 72.9% and HHI to 596. Despite a roughly 69:29 Republican tilt, Democrats won both chambers. Corporate money is more concentrated than family money (HHI 370–388), and crypto, online-betting and AI firms supplied 53% of it. When non-family corporations join the families, five firms enter the top 20 and CR 20 is 51.8%. Organised-interest domains such as crypto, betting and Israel policy are one-sided (domain HHI ≈ 10,000), and the NRA has shrunk by four-fifths since 2016. Automakers, defence contractors and drug companies work mainly through lobbying, which is the least concentrated channel by organisation (HHI < 30) but the most concentrated by class of interest: 48 of the top 50 lobbying spenders are businesses. Attributing corporate money by equity ownership, about 87% of identified large money traces to the top 1% of households. Originality/value The paper separates intra-class from inter-class concentration, distinguishes funders from intermediaries and electoral money from lobbying, proposes a class-indexed reading of HHI for political finance and sets out a monitoring and reform agenda. JEL Classification D72 · D31 · D63 · P16 · H11 · L11

Research Square
National School of Public Policy (PK)
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Laika access coming soon