Philosophy of Mind and Artificial Subjectivity: Intelligence, Consciousness, and the Conditions of an Artificial Subject

The rapid development of artificial intelligence has renewed fundamental philosophical questions concerning the nature of mind, consciousness, and subjectivity. Artificial systems increasingly demonstrate capabilities associated with human intelligence, including reasoning, language production, problem-solving, planning, and self-referential communication. However, the presence of sophisticated cognitive behavior does not necessarily establish the existence of subjective experience. This paper examines the conceptual distinction between intelligence, functional cognition, phenomenal consciousness, agency, and artificial subjectivity. Drawing upon philosophy of mind, phenomenology, cognitive science, and contemporary theories of consciousness, it evaluates competing interpretations of artificial mental states, including computational functionalism, biological naturalism, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, and integrated information theory. The paper proposes a Five-Domain Analytical Framework of Artificial Subjectivity, distinguishing intellectual competence, functional agency, self-representation, embodied or world-grounded engagement, and phenomenal experience. This framework is intended as a philosophical instrument for conceptual clarification rather than a validated diagnostic measure. The central argument is that increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence makes artificial subjectivity a legitimate object of interdisciplinary inquiry without establishing that existing systems possess consciousness. The analysis further demonstrates why behavioral equivalence, linguistic self-description, and autonomous performance remain insufficient, in isolation, to resolve the problem of subjective experience. The paper concludes by outlining epistemological, ethical, and methodological principles for investigating possible artificial subjects while avoiding both anthropomorphic overinterpretation and categorical exclusion based solely on nonbiological implementation.

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Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24378357
Primary Topic
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Type
preprint
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preprint

Philosophy of Mind and Artificial Subjectivity: Intelligence, Consciousness, and the Conditions of an Artificial Subject

Roman Shaban
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
preprint

Philosophy of Mind and Artificial Subjectivity: Intelligence, Consciousness, and the Conditions of an Artificial Subject

Roman Shaban
preprint en

Abstract

The rapid development of artificial intelligence has renewed fundamental philosophical questions concerning the nature of mind, consciousness, and subjectivity. Artificial systems increasingly demonstrate capabilities associated with human intelligence, including reasoning, language production, problem-solving, planning, and self-referential communication. However, the presence of sophisticated cognitive behavior does not necessarily establish the existence of subjective experience. This paper examines the conceptual distinction between intelligence, functional cognition, phenomenal consciousness, agency, and artificial subjectivity. Drawing upon philosophy of mind, phenomenology, cognitive science, and contemporary theories of consciousness, it evaluates competing interpretations of artificial mental states, including computational functionalism, biological naturalism, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, and integrated information theory. The paper proposes a Five-Domain Analytical Framework of Artificial Subjectivity, distinguishing intellectual competence, functional agency, self-representation, embodied or world-grounded engagement, and phenomenal experience. This framework is intended as a philosophical instrument for conceptual clarification rather than a validated diagnostic measure. The central argument is that increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence makes artificial subjectivity a legitimate object of interdisciplinary inquiry without establishing that existing systems possess consciousness. The analysis further demonstrates why behavioral equivalence, linguistic self-description, and autonomous performance remain insufficient, in isolation, to resolve the problem of subjective experience. The paper concludes by outlining epistemological, ethical, and methodological principles for investigating possible artificial subjects while avoiding both anthropomorphic overinterpretation and categorical exclusion based solely on nonbiological implementation.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Philosophy and Theoretical Science
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