A EXPLICAÇÃO DAS AÇÕES: UMA VISÃO COMPATIBILISTA

Norman Malcolm (1968) imagined a powerful neurophysiological theory, which he calls “mechanism,” capable of establishing the laws and the necessary and sufficient conditionsfor explaining bodily movements. This would provide a nonpurposive explanation of behavior. We also have a practice of purposive explanation of human behavior that invokes mental states. Purposive explanations explain actions, whereas “mechanism” explains bodily movements and postures. According to Malcolm, neither type of explanation is more fundamental than the other. Yet he considers them incompatible. We thus have two unconnected explananda. I will attemptto show the relevance of both types of explanation to an explanation of actions. There are no actions without control and motor processes, but invoking these aspects alone does not provide a complete explanation of an action. Drawing on evolutionary biology, I will attempt to show that we need both an internal, physical, proximate cause and a remote (mental) cause for a complete explanation of every type of action, including unintentional actions and omissions, explained in terms of frustrated expectations.

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Publication Details

Journal
Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2026.v18n44.p288-301
Primary Topic
Free Will and Agency
Type
article
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article

A EXPLICAÇÃO DAS AÇÕES: UMA VISÃO COMPATIBILISTA

André Leclerc
Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia
Free Will and Agency
article

A EXPLICAÇÃO DAS AÇÕES: UMA VISÃO COMPATIBILISTA

André Leclerc
article en

Abstract

Norman Malcolm (1968) imagined a powerful neurophysiological theory, which he calls “mechanism,” capable of establishing the laws and the necessary and sufficient conditionsfor explaining bodily movements. This would provide a nonpurposive explanation of behavior. We also have a practice of purposive explanation of human behavior that invokes mental states. Purposive explanations explain actions, whereas “mechanism” explains bodily movements and postures. According to Malcolm, neither type of explanation is more fundamental than the other. Yet he considers them incompatible. We thus have two unconnected explananda. I will attemptto show the relevance of both types of explanation to an explanation of actions. There are no actions without control and motor processes, but invoking these aspects alone does not provide a complete explanation of an action. Drawing on evolutionary biology, I will attempt to show that we need both an internal, physical, proximate cause and a remote (mental) cause for a complete explanation of every type of action, including unintentional actions and omissions, explained in terms of frustrated expectations.

Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em FilosofiaVol. 18(44)
Free Will and Agency
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