Zoning for Votes: How Local Politicians Use Land-Use Regulations for Political Gain

Across many levels of governments, elected officials engage in opportunistic behavior, through political budget cycles or ‘pork-barrel’ spending. Local politicians, however, have more limited ability to manipulate spending or pass popular policies due to federalist budget constraints and preemption. In the face of these constraints, I argue that local politicians use the tools at their disposal, particularly land-use regulations, treating zoning as pork. Using both lot-level zoning data in New York City and national data on historic districts, I show that land-use changes occur disproportionately on municipal election years. This effect is driven by those with the strongest electoral incentives: politicians up for reelection in competitive districts. Additionally, this zoning political budget cycle is larger for density-restrictions, consistent with anti-density public opinion, and tends to target lots with politically active residents. These findings suggest strategic electoral incentives help explain why many cities have restricted new housing despite an affordability crisis.

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Publication Details

Journal
SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/vpfgx_v1
Primary Topic
Urban Planning and Governance
Type
preprint
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Zoning for Votes: How Local Politicians Use Land-Use Regulations for Political Gain

Adrian C. Pietrzak
SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Urban Planning and Governance
preprint

Zoning for Votes: How Local Politicians Use Land-Use Regulations for Political Gain

Adrian C. Pietrzak
preprint en

Abstract

Across many levels of governments, elected officials engage in opportunistic behavior, through political budget cycles or ‘pork-barrel’ spending. Local politicians, however, have more limited ability to manipulate spending or pass popular policies due to federalist budget constraints and preemption. In the face of these constraints, I argue that local politicians use the tools at their disposal, particularly land-use regulations, treating zoning as pork. Using both lot-level zoning data in New York City and national data on historic districts, I show that land-use changes occur disproportionately on municipal election years. This effect is driven by those with the strongest electoral incentives: politicians up for reelection in competitive districts. Additionally, this zoning political budget cycle is larger for density-restrictions, consistent with anti-density public opinion, and tends to target lots with politically active residents. These findings suggest strategic electoral incentives help explain why many cities have restricted new housing despite an affordability crisis.

SocArXiv (OSF Preprints)
Princeton University (US)
Urban Planning and Governance
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