On the Complexity of Envy Cycle Elimination

The envy cycle elimination (ECE) algorithm is a fundamental algorithm for the fair allocation of indivisible goods, guaranteeing an allocation that is envy-free up to one good under arbitrary monotone utilities. We show that the ECE algorithm can be implemented in $O(nm)$ time for $n$ agents and $m$ goods, and establish the tightness of this bound.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
arXiv (Cornell University)
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2611.24167
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Voting Systems
Type
preprint
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preprint

On the Complexity of Envy Cycle Elimination

Warut Suksompong
arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Voting Systems
preprint

On the Complexity of Envy Cycle Elimination

Warut Suksompong
preprint en

Abstract

The envy cycle elimination (ECE) algorithm is a fundamental algorithm for the fair allocation of indivisible goods, guaranteeing an allocation that is envy-free up to one good under arbitrary monotone utilities. We show that the ECE algorithm can be implemented in $O(nm)$ time for $n$ agents and $m$ goods, and establish the tightness of this bound.

arXiv (Cornell University)
Game Theory and Voting Systems
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