Vertical Cross-Ownership, Trade Costs, and the Choice of International Commodity Taxation
This paper examines the role of partial vertical cross-ownership in determining optimal commodity tax principles. First, our results show that increasing cross-ownership lowers the optimal origin-based tax but raises the destination-based tax. Second, the resulting tax differential, driven by the synergy between cross-ownership and trade costs, governs the welfare comparison. Third, under symmetric ownership, the tax principle that generates the higher equilibrium tax rate also yields higher global welfare. Under asymmetric ownership, the welfare ranking depends on the interaction between unilateral ownership and trade costs.
Authors
- Chia‐Jen Chang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1870-6506)
- Tsaur‐Chin Wu
- Tai-Lung Chou (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-8492-5655)
Institutions
- Overseas Chinese University (TW)
- Feng Chia University (TW)
- National Changhua University of Education (TW)
Publication Details
- Journal
- German Economic Review
- Published
- 2026-11-19
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1515/ger-2026-0034
- Primary Topic
- Global trade and economics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00