Mnemic Extension and Appropriate Causation

Philosophers of memory often assume that the extended mind hypothesis is compatible with the causal theory of memory. For extracranial resources can, the idea goes, sustain the causal connection between a past event and a present representation of it that, on causalist views, distinguishes genuine remembering. Some go as far as to claim that constructive versions of the causal theory can accommodate complementarity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis. This paper casts doubt on these ideas by defending two claims. First, the existing arguments for compatibility are flawed. While some conflate external information storage with cognitive extension, others wrongly hold that fulfilling the conditions for cognitive extension secures the appropriate kind of causal connection for remembering. Second, constructive versions of the causal theory and complementarity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis are in fact incompatible. For constructive causal theories require of memory traces features that functionally disparate but complementary extracranial resources systematically lack. The paper concludes by considering how parity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis might fare within the causal theory, and how other theories of memory might be assessed for compatibility with the extended mind hypothesis.

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Publication Details

Journal
Erkenntnis
Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-026-01185-x
Primary Topic
Embodied and Extended Cognition
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Mnemic Extension and Appropriate Causation

Juan Fernando Álvarez Céspedes
Erkenntnis
Embodied and Extended Cognition
article

Mnemic Extension and Appropriate Causation

Juan Fernando Álvarez Céspedes
article en

Abstract

Philosophers of memory often assume that the extended mind hypothesis is compatible with the causal theory of memory. For extracranial resources can, the idea goes, sustain the causal connection between a past event and a present representation of it that, on causalist views, distinguishes genuine remembering. Some go as far as to claim that constructive versions of the causal theory can accommodate complementarity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis. This paper casts doubt on these ideas by defending two claims. First, the existing arguments for compatibility are flawed. While some conflate external information storage with cognitive extension, others wrongly hold that fulfilling the conditions for cognitive extension secures the appropriate kind of causal connection for remembering. Second, constructive versions of the causal theory and complementarity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis are in fact incompatible. For constructive causal theories require of memory traces features that functionally disparate but complementary extracranial resources systematically lack. The paper concludes by considering how parity-based versions of the extended mind hypothesis might fare within the causal theory, and how other theories of memory might be assessed for compatibility with the extended mind hypothesis.

Erkenntnis
Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
Embodied and Extended Cognition
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