The Political Consequences of Stakeholder Governance

We study the political economy of stakeholder governance and corporate lobbying. Lobbying shifts policy toward outcomes that increase the firm's profitability, but it also provokes a backlash from advocacy groups, which push policy back toward the median citizen's preferred outcome. When lobbying is opaque, this backlash generates a ratchet effect: lobbying and backlash escalate, fueling political polarization and instability with little or no policy gain for the firm. To buy quiet, firms adopt stakeholder governance, delegating lobbying to a manager who places less weight on profits and more on citizens' welfare and therefore lobbies less. When the conflict between the firm and society is small, stakeholder governance leads to more socially responsible policies without sacrificing the firm's profits. Paradoxically, when the conflict is large, delegating to a more socially minded manager benefits the firm at society's expense, producing more extreme, socially harmful policies, even when the delegation creates no new agency problems. Our results suggest that stakeholder governance can have unintended political consequences and offer novel implications for corporate governance and lobbying regulation.

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Publication Details

Published
2026-11-19
DOI
https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-fin-1173-2026
Primary Topic
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Type
preprint
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preprint

The Political Consequences of Stakeholder Governance

Doron Levit, Markus Parlasca, Paul Voß
Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
preprint

The Political Consequences of Stakeholder Governance

Doron Levit, Markus Parlasca, Paul Voß
preprint en

Abstract

We study the political economy of stakeholder governance and corporate lobbying. Lobbying shifts policy toward outcomes that increase the firm's profitability, but it also provokes a backlash from advocacy groups, which push policy back toward the median citizen's preferred outcome. When lobbying is opaque, this backlash generates a ratchet effect: lobbying and backlash escalate, fueling political polarization and instability with little or no policy gain for the firm. To buy quiet, firms adopt stakeholder governance, delegating lobbying to a manager who places less weight on profits and more on citizens' welfare and therefore lobbies less. When the conflict between the firm and society is small, stakeholder governance leads to more socially responsible policies without sacrificing the firm's profits. Paradoxically, when the conflict is large, delegating to a more socially minded manager benefits the firm at society's expense, producing more extreme, socially harmful policies, even when the delegation creates no new agency problems. Our results suggest that stakeholder governance can have unintended political consequences and offer novel implications for corporate governance and lobbying regulation.

Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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