An Evolutionary Game Study on Contributors’ Knowledge Sharing Behavior in Open Source Communities from an Intellectual Property Governance Perspective

Intellectual property (IP) risks, such as code misappropriation, copyright disputes, and license incompatibility, have become a bottleneck for knowledge sharing and collaborative innovation in open source communities (OSCs). Digital technologies such as blockchain-based provenance tracking and AI-assisted compliance auditing could ease these risks, yet how platform governance and contributors’ sharing behavior interact over time is still poorly understood. To address this gap, this study builds a two-echelon evolutionary game framework between open source community platforms and developers, with the probability and payoffs of digital technology empowerment included as explicit parameters. Using replicator dynamic equations and local asymptotic stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix, we identify four possible evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and derive the boundary conditions under which the system moves between them. Analysis and simulation support three findings. (1) Long-run convergence depends on dynamic net payoff thresholds: when platform digital governance yields sufficient net utility and contributors’ risk-adjusted benefits exceed withholding payoffs, the system leaves the inferior lock-in states (0,0), (0,1), or (1,0) and settles at the Pareto-optimal state (1,1) {Governance, Share}; (2) The probability (p) of digital empowerment behaves like a bifurcation parameter: below its critical value, the vulnerability penalties of traditional manual governance push platforms toward non-governance (x -> 0); once the threshold is crossed, payoff dominance flips and the system converges to active governance (x -> 1) even when initial willingness is low; and (3) digital empowerment cuts manual friction costs and expands cooperative spillovers, which stabilizes contributors’ attribution and trust. Overall, the study traces how behavior co-evolves at the micro level in open source governance and offers guidance for designing blockchain-traceable, AI-audited open innovation ecosystems with sustainable incentives.

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Publication Details

Journal
Academic journal of management and social sciences
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.54097/x6m5c737
Primary Topic
Open Source Software Innovations
Type
article
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article

An Evolutionary Game Study on Contributors’ Knowledge Sharing Behavior in Open Source Communities from an Intellectual Property Governance Perspective

Ruihan Wang
Academic journal of management and social sciences
Open Source Software Innovations
article

An Evolutionary Game Study on Contributors’ Knowledge Sharing Behavior in Open Source Communities from an Intellectual Property Governance Perspective

Ruihan Wang
article en

Abstract

Intellectual property (IP) risks, such as code misappropriation, copyright disputes, and license incompatibility, have become a bottleneck for knowledge sharing and collaborative innovation in open source communities (OSCs). Digital technologies such as blockchain-based provenance tracking and AI-assisted compliance auditing could ease these risks, yet how platform governance and contributors’ sharing behavior interact over time is still poorly understood. To address this gap, this study builds a two-echelon evolutionary game framework between open source community platforms and developers, with the probability and payoffs of digital technology empowerment included as explicit parameters. Using replicator dynamic equations and local asymptotic stability analysis of the Jacobian matrix, we identify four possible evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and derive the boundary conditions under which the system moves between them. Analysis and simulation support three findings. (1) Long-run convergence depends on dynamic net payoff thresholds: when platform digital governance yields sufficient net utility and contributors’ risk-adjusted benefits exceed withholding payoffs, the system leaves the inferior lock-in states (0,0), (0,1), or (1,0) and settles at the Pareto-optimal state (1,1) {Governance, Share}; (2) The probability (p) of digital empowerment behaves like a bifurcation parameter: below its critical value, the vulnerability penalties of traditional manual governance push platforms toward non-governance (x -> 0); once the threshold is crossed, payoff dominance flips and the system converges to active governance (x -> 1) even when initial willingness is low; and (3) digital empowerment cuts manual friction costs and expands cooperative spillovers, which stabilizes contributors’ attribution and trust. Overall, the study traces how behavior co-evolves at the micro level in open source governance and offers guidance for designing blockchain-traceable, AI-audited open innovation ecosystems with sustainable incentives.

Academic journal of management and social sciencesVol. 18(2)
Nanjing University of Science and Technology (CN)
Open Source Software Innovations
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