Typological Determination of the Negligence Liability of Generative Artificial Intelligence Providers

The iterative evolution of generative artificial intelligence has given rise to novel criminal risks. For a long time, academic debate has remained locked in the binary controversy over whether strong artificial intelligence qualifies as a subject of criminal liability, while few studies have turned to the practical question of how liability should be attributed to providers. Attribution thinking remains trapped within the conventional paradigm of subject-status determination. Provider liability is often presumed to be liability for negligent crimes, with accountability pursued by stretching the causal chain, yet the preconditions for establishing negligence liability have not been adequately examined, the boundaries of attribution remain vague, and no systematic determination framework has been constructed. Moving beyond the controversy over subject status, this paper divides scenarios according to differences in the logic of harm production, and the paths of attribution diverge accordingly. In traditional negligence scenarios, harm mostly stems from human carelessness at the source stage, and autonomous algorithmic decision-making does not substantially intervene in the causal process; the traditional logic of negligent crimes can therefore be applied by relying on foreseeability, the duty of result avoidance, and adequate causation. In scenarios of independent harm infliction by artificial intelligence, by contrast, autonomous algorithmic output breaks the causal chain, the theory of supervisory negligence faces dogmatic difficulties, and the focus of attribution shifts to the post-hoc removal duty, so that legal interests are protected through the path of duty offenses. Between the protection of legal interests and technological innovation, the criminal law should maintain modesty and treat administrative regulation as the preferred path of governance.

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Publication Details

Journal
Academic journal of management and social sciences
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.54097/weex6x65
Primary Topic
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
Type
article
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article

Typological Determination of the Negligence Liability of Generative Artificial Intelligence Providers

Xinyue Song
Academic journal of management and social sciences
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
article

Typological Determination of the Negligence Liability of Generative Artificial Intelligence Providers

Xinyue Song
article en

Abstract

The iterative evolution of generative artificial intelligence has given rise to novel criminal risks. For a long time, academic debate has remained locked in the binary controversy over whether strong artificial intelligence qualifies as a subject of criminal liability, while few studies have turned to the practical question of how liability should be attributed to providers. Attribution thinking remains trapped within the conventional paradigm of subject-status determination. Provider liability is often presumed to be liability for negligent crimes, with accountability pursued by stretching the causal chain, yet the preconditions for establishing negligence liability have not been adequately examined, the boundaries of attribution remain vague, and no systematic determination framework has been constructed. Moving beyond the controversy over subject status, this paper divides scenarios according to differences in the logic of harm production, and the paths of attribution diverge accordingly. In traditional negligence scenarios, harm mostly stems from human carelessness at the source stage, and autonomous algorithmic decision-making does not substantially intervene in the causal process; the traditional logic of negligent crimes can therefore be applied by relying on foreseeability, the duty of result avoidance, and adequate causation. In scenarios of independent harm infliction by artificial intelligence, by contrast, autonomous algorithmic output breaks the causal chain, the theory of supervisory negligence faces dogmatic difficulties, and the focus of attribution shifts to the post-hoc removal duty, so that legal interests are protected through the path of duty offenses. Between the protection of legal interests and technological innovation, the criminal law should maintain modesty and treat administrative regulation as the preferred path of governance.

Academic journal of management and social sciencesVol. 18(2)
Northeastern University (CN)
Digitalization, Law, and Regulation
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